The Labor Market of Italian Politicians by MERLO, Antonio et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
10-2008
The Labor Market of Italian Politicians
Antonio MERLO
University of Pennsylvania
Vincenzo GALASSO
Bocconi University
Massimiliano LANDI
Singapore Management University, landim@smu.edu.sg
Andrea MATTOZZI
California Institute of Technology
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Political Economy Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
MERLO, Antonio; GALASSO, Vincenzo; LANDI, Massimiliano; and MATTOZZI, Andrea. The Labor Market of Italian Politicians.
(2008). 1-107. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1133
 
 
ANY OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR(S) AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF 
THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS , SMU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Labor Market of Italian Politicians* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Massimiliano Landi, Antonio Merlo, Vincenzo Galasso, Andrea Mattozzi 
October 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Paper No. 15-2008 
The Labor Market of Italian Politicians* 
 
 
Antonio Merlo 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Vincenzo Galasso 
Universita’ Bocconi 
 
Massimiliano Landi 
Singapore Management University 
 
Andrea Mattozzi 
California Institute of Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2008 
Revised, October 2008 
 
 
 
 
ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE:  Antonio Merlo, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 
3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104. E-mail: merloa@econ.upenn.edu 
 
 
* Paper presented at the X European Conference of the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti on “La Selezione 
della Classe Dirigente,” Gaeta, Italy, May 24, 2008. We would like to thank Luca Anderlini, Tito Boeri, 
Daniela Iorio, Petra Todd and Ken Wolpin for their helpful comments and suggestions.  We would also like 
to thank Giancarlo Bartoloni, Fausto Bertinotti, Vincenzo Busa, Sandro Panarello, Teo Ruffa, and Agenzia 
delle Entrate, Associazione Ex-Parlamentary, Servizio Prerogative e Immunita’ and Ufficio di Presidenza 
della Camera for their help and assistance with the collection and the interpretation of the data. A special 
thank to the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti for their help and financial support. Landi also 
acknowledges the financial support from the Office of Research at Singapore Management University, and 
the hospitality of Servizio Prerogative e Immunita’ della Camera during the consultation of the archive of 
the tax returns of the elected members of the Italian Parliament. Financial support from National Science 
Foundation grant SES-0617901 to Mattozzi and SES-0617892 to Merlo is gratefully acknowledged. 
Valentina Adorno, Piero Biroli, Elisa Farri, Guido Maretto, Paola Monti, Mara Squicciarini, Panos 
Stavrinides, Michela Tincani, and especially Francesca Benvenuti provided invaluable help and excellent 
assistance throughout the construction of the dataset. 
 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
Like voters (the represented), politicians (the representees) are the heart and soul of 
representative democracy. But isn’t being a politician just like any other job? After we 
get past the rhetoric, is politics any different than other occupations? In the political 
sector, voters, parties and politicians represent the counterparts of consumers, firms and 
workers/managers in the market sector. In fact, the analogy is much deeper than it may 
appear at first sight. In the market sector, consumers determine to a large extent the 
success of a firm and ultimately the management’s fate. However, managers are chosen 
by the firms, which typically have an objective that is different from those of consumers 
and managers. Likewise, while in all democratic systems the voters ultimately determine 
who is elected, it is typically the case that political parties nominate candidates for public 
office. Furthermore, the objectives of voters and parties with respect to the selection of 
candidates may differ, and are constrained by the career ambitions of individuals with 
political aspirations. But then, what really makes a career in the political sector different 
from a career in any other economic sector? 
 
There are at least three distinctive features that characterize the labor market in the 
political sector. First, politicians are typically “under the spotlight,” receiving the 
attention of the media and of a variety of citizens’ organizations. This makes politics a 
“showcase,” where politicians in office can display their political skills, while it might be 
more difficult for individuals working in the market sector to reveal their market ability. 
Second, inter-party competition for potential politicians is likely to be of secondary 
importance, as ideological preferences are more likely to attract individuals toward 
specific parties at the beginning of their political careers. Third, it is often the case that 
political parties “take care of their losers” by reserving party’s positions to defeated 
incumbents. As a result, while individual careers within the political sector are inevitably 
linked to the opportunities available within parties, the extent to which individual 
endowments of “political” and “market” skills are correlated, or experience in the 
political (market) sector is also valuable in the market (political) sector, links the labor 
markets of the two sectors. This link affects the selection of politicians, the politicians’ 
careers, and the relationship between parties and voters. 
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In his famous 1918 lecture Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber writes: 
   “Politics, just as economic pursuits, may be a man's avocation or his vocation. 
[...] There are two ways of making politics one's vocation: Either one lives ‘for’ 
politics or one lives ‘off’ politics. [...] He who lives ‘for’ politics makes politics his 
life, in an internal sense. Either he enjoys the naked possession of the power he 
exerts, or he nourishes his inner balance and self-feeling by the consciousness that 
his life has meaning in the service of a ‘cause.’ [...] He who strives to make politics 
a permanent source of income lives ‘off’ politics as a vocation.” [from Gerth and 
Mills (1946; pp. 83-84)] 
This quote highlights the importance of analyzing the motivations of politicians in the 
context of their career decisions over the life-cycle, and represents the starting point of a 
large literature where scholars from different disciplines within the social sciences have 
been tackling these issues from a variety of angles.1 
 
In this study, we analyze the career profiles of Italian legislators in the post-war period. 
Using a unique, newly collected dataset that contains detailed information on all the 
politicians who have been elected to the Italian Parliament between 1948 and 2008, we 
address a number of important issues that pertain to their career paths prior to election to 
Parliament, their parliamentary careers, and their post-Parliament employment. Our data 
span two institutional regimes: Italy’s First Republic (1948-1994) and the Second 
Republic (1994-present), characterized by different electoral rules and party structures. 
 
 
                                                          
1 The contributions by sociologists and political scientists are particularly numerous, and it is outside of the 
scope of this study to survey this literature, which is vast even if one were to restrict attention to the case of 
Italy. In addition to the references we cite in the remainder of this study, there are many others we read to 
help us place our work in the context of the literature. In particular, we refer the interested reader to 
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981), Bartolini and D’Alimonte (1996), Caciagli and Barnes (1994), 
Cotta and Isernia (1996), Di Palma (1977), Di Palma and Cotta (1986), Dogan (1975, 1989), Doring 
(1995), Eldersveld (1989), Ignazi and Ysmal (1998), La Palombara (1987), La Palombara and Weiner 
(1996), Morlino (1998), Norris (1997), Norris and Lovenduski (1995), Patzelt (1999), Putman (1976), 
Sartori (1966), Spotts and Wieser (1986), Verzichelli (1994, 1996), Vianello and Moor (2000), and 
Wertman (1988). The economics literature on this topic is more recent and quite smaller, and is surveyed 
by Merlo (2006). 
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In Chapter I, we present a brief overview of the Italian political system. Countries differ 
with respect to their political institutions, which affect the way in which voters, 
politicians, political parties, the legislature and the government interact, as well as the 
“industrial organization” of the political sector. The overview of the institutional details 
of the Italian political system we provide highlights the role played by parties in the 
selection of politicians and the way in which changes in the electoral law may have 
affected  the selection process as well as the parties’ internal organization and the overall 
structure of the party system.  
 
In Chapter II, we provide a comprehensive view of the career profiles of Italian 
legislators over the entire sample period 1948-2008. In particular, we document the 
extent to which the characteristics of Italian legislators (such as their age, gender, 
education, occupation and income prior to entering the Parliament) have changed over 
time and highlight the major differences between the First and the Second Republic. To 
provide a term of comparison, we also contrast the profiles of Italian legislators and their 
evolution over the post-war period to those of the members of the United States 
Congress.  
 
In Chapter III, we use our data to address a number of questions that pertain to the 
selection of Italian politicians, their labor market, and their overall quality. We then draw 
some general conclusions that contribute to the debate about the relative efficacy and 
desirability of alternative policies regarding the selection and the compensation of elected 
representatives. 
 
Before turning our attention to the details of our study of the careers of Italian politicians 
it is legitimate to ask whether Italy represents a good case study in a broader European 
context or, in other words, to what extent Italian legislators are similar to their 
counterparts in other European countries with respect to their demographic 
characteristics. To address this issue, Table 1 reports the average age, the percentage of 
female legislators and the percentage of legislators with a college degree in the most 
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recent legislature for a number of European countries; while Figures 1, 2 and 3 depict the 
time series of these variables for Italy and Germany over their first 15 legislatures. As we 
can see from Table 1, Italy is by no means an outlier with respect to any of these 
measures although the cross-country variation in each of these dimensions of the data is 
quite substantial. With respect to changes over time in the composition of the legislature, 
Figures 1-3 show that the average age and the percentage of female in the legislature 
followed similar patterns in Italy and in Germany. The percentage of legislators with a 
college degree, on the other hand, decreased over time in Italy while it increased in 
Germany.  
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Table 1: Legislators’ characteristics in selected European countries 
Country Year Average Age % Female
% College 
Degree 
Austria 2006 49.1 31.1 36.6 
Belgium 2007 44.0 37.9 79.3 
Denmark 2007 45.3 37.7 67.4 
Finland 2007 46.2 42.0 66.5 
France 2007 56.4 18.3 n.a. 
Germany 2005 49.3 32.5 86.7 
Iceland 2007 49.7 31.7 n.a. 
Italy 2007 52.0 16.3 68.5 
The Netherlands 2006 42.2 36.6 60.0 
Sweden 2006 49.0 47.3 66.7 
Switzerland 2007 51.0 28.5 n.a. 
United Kingdom 2005 48.2 19.8 67.0 
Average  48.5 31.6 66.5 
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Figure 1: Average age of legislators by legislature
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Figure 2: Percentage of female legislators by legislature
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Figure 3: Percentage of legislators with a college degree by 
legislature
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CHAPTER I: Institutional background 
 
The set of political institutions put in place by the 1948 Italian Constitution were 
designed to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of the majority, and required 
the political and institutional power to be shared among many actors. This was achieved 
through the establishment of a strong bicameral parliamentary system where the balance 
of power between the legislative and the executive branches favored the former, and 
through a proportional electoral law, which guaranteed the representation of many 
political forces in the Parliament leading to a multiparty system and to executive power 
sharing within broad coalition governments. The combination of all of these features 
makes Italy a consensus democracy. 
 
1. The Italian Parliament 
Italy is a parliamentary democracy with a perfect bicameral structure, where the House 
(Camera dei Deputati) and the Senate (Senato della Repubblica) have symmetric 
legislative power. In fact, during the iter legis, which represents the procedure to finalize 
a law, the text of the law has to be approved by both chambers.2 Approvals typically 
require a simple majority of votes of the members who are present at the time of 
deliberation (quorum funzionale). The presence of a majority of the members of each 
chamber is however needed for any decision to be valid (quorum strutturale).3  
 
The House is composed of 630 members (MPs), all chosen by the Italian electorate 
during general political elections.4 The Senate, on the other hand, has 315 elected 
members chosen through competitive elections, but also a handful of non-elected 
members. Non-elected members of the Senate are the past Italian Presidents (senatori di 
                                                          
2 Typically, the initiative to draft a law arises within the government or is brought up by some members of 
the Parliaments, and is then assigned to a committee for further investigation. The newly drafted text has to 
be approved by (simple) majority by the committee and then by the two chambers of Parliament. If either 
chamber modifies the text that was previously approved by the other chamber, the text has to go back to the 
previous chamber for a new approval. 
3 In the House, abstentions are not counted as votes – effectively reducing the number of votes required to 
pass a law; whereas in the Senate, abstentions are counted as votes – thereby maintaining constant the 
number of votes required to pass a law.  
4 The number of representatives became fixed at 630 in the 1963 election. In the previous three 
Legislatures, it depended on the size of the population in each electoral district. The number of 
representatives who were elected to the House prior to 1963 was 574 in 1948, 590 in 1953 and 623 in 1958. 
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diritto a vita) and those citizens who have been declared senators for life (senatori a vita) 
by the Italian Presidents, as the highest national recognition for exceptional achievements 
in science, art or social life. 
 
The constitutionally mandated duration of a parliamentary term or Legislature is five 
years. Within seventy days before the end of a Legislature new elections have to take 
place to nominate the members of the new Parliament. Early elections may however take 
place before the regular end of the Legislature. Indeed, early elections have been 
relatively frequent in Italy, as documented in Table 1, which reports the beginning and 
end dates of the 15 Italian Legislatures between 1948 and 2008. The authority to dissolve 
Parliament and call early elections rests with the President of the Republic, who by 
calling an early election acknowledges and certifies that the current Parliament is unable 
to support the formation of a government (i.e., no government can obtain a majority of 
the votes in each of the two chambers of Parliament). 
 
The (active) electorate for the House is composed of all Italian citizens who have reached 
18 years of age, whereas the voting age for the Senate is 25 years. Differences in age 
restrictions across elections are a peculiar feature of the Italian system, since everywhere 
else in Europe the minimum age to vote in all elections is 18 years, with the sole 
exception of Belgium, where voters have to be at least 21 years old. Age restrictions are 
also imposed on the passive electorate. To be eligible to become a member of the 
Parliament, an Italian citizen has to be at least 25 years old for the House and at least 40 
years old for the Senate. The latter is the highest age limit in Europe.5 
 
The members of the Italian Parliament enjoy a special status. Regardless of the party list 
or of the geographic location of the district in which they have been elected, the members 
of Parliament have the legal duty of representing the interest of the entire nation. For 
instance, their electoral-affiliation party has no formal control over their political or 
voting behavior while in Parliament. Moreover, MPs cannot be arrested or prosecuted 
                                                          
5 The only other European country that imposes such a limit is the Czech Republic. In Belgium, candidates 
have to be older than 21 years of age, in France 23 and in Greece 25. 
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without a previous permission granted by the chamber of Parliament they belong to, 
except in few special instances.  
 
The relative importance of the legislative power (the Parliament) vis-à-vis the executive 
power (the government) is captured by two important institutional features that regulate 
the interaction between these two functions. First, the head of the government (the Prime 
Minister) is not directly elected by the citizens, but is instead selected by the Parliament. 
Typically, the name of the prime minister (and the composition of his cabinet) emerges 
from consultations among the major parties. However, to assume power, the government 
must be approved by a majority in each chamber of Parliament (investiture vote). Second, 
the Prime Minister is responsible to the Parliament. Namely, in order to remain in power 
the government must retain the support of a parliamentary majority, and either chamber 
of Parliament can remove the Prime Minister from office at any time with a legislative 
vote of no confidence.  
 
Political parties play an important role within the organization and the daily working of 
the Italian Parliament. Each chamber of Parliament has a President and an Office of the 
President, which represent all the parties and have mainly administrative duties, as well 
as some (permanent) committees. In addition, the parties also have some institutional 
organizations within the Parliament: the parliamentary groups (where typically each 
group represents a different party, although the mapping between parties and groups has 
become increasingly complicated over the years), and the heads of these groups 
(Capigruppo), who jointly form a body called Conferenza dei Capigruppo, which has an 
important agenda-setting role since it determines the calendar of the Parliament and the 
issues to be discussed during each parliamentary session. 
 
2. The electoral law 
The 1948 Italian Constitution instituted an electoral law with proportional representation 
for both chambers of the Parliament. In the House, the proportionality applied at the 
national level to elect all the representatives. The entire electorate was divided in large 
electoral districts. In each district several MPs were elected. In the Senate, on the other 
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hand, the proportionality applied at the regional level. Each of the 20 Italian regions 
elected a share of the 315 senators, according to its population, with a minimum of seven 
senators per region, except for small regions, such as Valle d’Aosta (which elected only 
one senator), and Molise (which elected two). 
 
The proportional rule that had regulated the Italian electoral system since WWII, 
however, came under strain at the end of the 1980s. This was partially due to the 
increasing instability of the governments, which was often blamed on the increase in the 
number of parties, and on the growing relevance of small parties in the coalition 
governments. As we can see from Table 2, which lists all Italian governments from 1948 
to 2008, during the 1980s Italy experienced twelve governments, which lasted on average 
less than a year.6 These short lasting executives were typically coalition governments, 
and in four instances the Prime Minister did not belong to the largest party, which at that 
time was the Christian Democratic Party or Democrazia Cristiana (DC). A move from a 
proportional to a majoritarian electoral rule was thus presented as an effective way of 
reducing the power of the small parties and thereby increasing the stability of the 
executive.  
 
In 1990, a popular referendum was proposed by several politicians with the objective of 
eliminating the proportional electoral rule for the Senate and also eliminating the 
possibility of expressing preferences for multiple candidates on each ballot for the House. 
While the Italian Constitutional Court ruled against the admissibility of the former 
referendum, the latter was held in 1991. Almost 95% of the 30 millions Italians who 
voted (65% of the electorate) agreed on abandoning the much criticized multiple vote of 
preference for House elections. Two years later, the legitimacy of the referendum to 
eliminate the proportional electoral rule for the Senate was approved by the Italian 
Constitutional Court, and on April 18th and 19th 1993, 77% of the Italian electorate voted 
in the referendum and determined by a large majority (82.7%) the end of the proportional 
electoral rule for the Senate. 
 
                                                          
6 One cabinet, led by Amintore Fanfani, only lasted eleven days. 
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Soon after the 1993 referendum, a major modification of the Italian electoral system was 
implemented for both chambers of Parliament by the so-called “Legge Mattarella” of 
1994 (named after the Christian Democrat legislator Sergio Mattarella who sponsored it). 
In the House, Italy moved from a pure proportional system to a mixed system, where 
75% of the representatives were elected with a majoritarian system and the remaining 
25% according to the proportional system.7 Italy was divided into 475 uninominal House 
districts. In each district, one representative was elected by simple plurality according to 
a pure first-past-the-post election. The remaining representatives were then selected with 
a proportional rule among the candidates of those parties which were able to reach a 
threshold of at least 4% of the votes, with a mechanism favoring the losing parties in the 
uninominal districts. The 1994 law also modified the electoral rule for the Senate. In the 
new mixed system, 232 senators were elected according to a simple plurality rule in the 
232 uninominal Senate electoral districts in which Italy was partitioned. The remaining 
83 representatives of the Senate, previously allocated in fixed numbers among the twenty 
Italian regions, were then selected according to a proportional system. In each region, the 
representatives elected in the proportional system were selected using the votes received 
by the losing candidates in the uninominal districts of the region.8  
 
Three Legislatures later, in the eve of the 2006 national elections, the Italian electoral 
system was again modified to move back to a proportional system, although with some 
notable differences with respect to the original proportional system which had been in use 
between 1948 and 1994. Representatives to the House are now elected according to 
proportional rule with a double threshold. If a party does not belong to a coalition, in 
order to gain a seat in the House, it has to reach the threshold of 4% of the total votes. If 
instead the party is linked to other parties in a coalition, the threshold (for each party in 
the coalition) becomes 2%. Special rules apply to allow the first two parties which do not 
reach these thresholds to gain a seat in the Parliament. In the House, the strict 
                                                          
7 The choice of attributing 25% of the seats according to the proportional rule was highly criticized by the 
proposers of the 1993 referendum, who claimed that the 1994 law contradicted the spirit of the referendum 
of abandoning the proportional system. Two additional referenda in April 1999 and May 2000 tried to 
eliminate the 25% proportional quota. However, neither referendum reached the required quorum of 50% 
of the votes (the turnout in the 1999 referendum was 49.6% of the population of eligible voters, thereby 
falling short of the threshold by less than 210,000 votes). 
8 The votes received by the winning candidates in the uninominal districts were not counted. 
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proportionality rule is also modified to allow for a premium (in terms of additional seats 
in the Parliament) to be assigned to the party (or coalition) which obtains the relative 
majority. Accordingly, the party with the relative majority is guaranteed at least 340 seats 
out of the 630 seats available. 
 
An analogous change was implemented in the electoral law for the Senate. The 
proportional representation was introduced to assign the seats at the regional level with a 
premium (in terms of additional seats) for the party with the relative majority, again at the 
regional level. Single parties were allowed to form coalitions to reach the majority 
premium. The coalition enjoying the relative majority within the region is awarded a 
number of representatives in the Senate equal to 55% of the representatives in the region, 
unless the received votes would provide the coalition with even more seats.  The 
minimum (regional) threshold to obtain a seat is equal to 20% of the votes in the region 
for a coalition and to 8% for a single party (or for a party in a coalition that fails to reach 
20% of the votes).9 Within each coalition, votes are shared among the parties that have 
received at least 3% of the votes.  
 
A controversial feature of this electoral system is that voters are only allowed to cast a 
ballot for the party, but not for individual candidates. Clearly, this system (which is 
typically referred to as “closed-list proportional representation”) enhances the power of 
the political parties and strengthens their influence over the selection of legislators. In 
fact, since voters cannot choose among the various candidates within a party list, the 
elected representatives are effectively selected by the parties, which decide how to rank 
the candidates in their list. We address the issue of the selection of elected representatives 
and the role of parties in the selection process in more details below. 
 
It is interesting to note that the introduction of the mixed majoritarian-proportional 
system in 1994 had initially proven effective in reducing the number of parties 
represented in the Parliament with respect to its 1992 level (see Figure 1). Yet, this effect 
appeared to be quite short-lived and unstable as the number of parties increased in the 
                                                          
9 The effective thresholds are indeed higher, due to the small number of seats per region.  
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1996 election before dropping again after the 2001 election. After the 2006 election, 
following the return to a proportional system, the number of parties which obtained 
parliamentary representation increased again. The duration of the Italian governments 
also changed somewhat after the changes in the electoral law. Since the 1994 election, 
Italy has experienced an increase in the average duration of a government of about one 
year with respect to the average government duration over the period 1948-1994 (see 
Table 2). 
 
3. A tale of two Republics 
In addition to the first major change in Italy’s electoral law that we described above, 1994 
also marked the end of an era in Italian politics, and the beginning of a new phase. It is 
now common to refer to the period that goes from the beginning of the first Legislature to 
the end of the 11th Legislature as Italy’s First Republic (May 1948-April 1994), and the 
period inaugurated with the election of the 12th Legislature in April of 1994 as Italy’s 
Second Republic.  
 
The process that eventually lead to the demise of the old system started in February 1992, 
when judge Antonio Di Pietro had Mario Chiesa, a member of the Socialist Party or 
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), arrested on a  corruption charge. The event marked the 
beginning of a massive judicial investigation into political corruption, which soon 
became known as “Operation Clean Hands” (Mani Pulite).10 In the ten years that 
followed, the pool of Milan-based judges that worked on the case prosecuted more than 
3,000 people, many of whom were politicians, but which also included industry leaders 
and public managers. According to the official judicial records 1,254 individuals were 
convicted, while 910 were found not guilty. This investigation uncovered a large 
corruption network (which is commonly referred to as “Bribeville” or “Tangentopoli”), 
which controlled several critical aspects at the junction between the economic and the 
political system. The demise of this network had profound consequences for the Italian 
political system, and lead to a dramatic change in the structure and the organization of its 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Colajanni (1996). 
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political parties. We therefore discuss the role of the political parties in the recruitment of 
politicians during the First and the Second Republic, separately. 
 
3.1  The political parties of the First Republic 
The political class of Italy’s First Republic was considerably different from the political 
class of the pre-war period. In fact, while the latter was mainly composed of landowners 
and nobility (the notables), the post-war political scene has been increasingly dominated 
by modern party professionals. The transformation process was very gradual, and some 
scholars suggest that elements indicating an ongoing change in this direction were 
already present at the beginning of the 20th century with an increasing proportion of  
blue-collar workers and, in particular, public sector employees being elected to 
Parliament. This trend affected virtually all political parties. 
 
The early renewal process of the Italian political class, however, came to a grinding halt 
during the Fascist dictatorship. What is particularly relevant for our purposes is that this 
non-democratic regime had long-lasting consequences on the post-war recruitment of 
politicians, affecting in particular the fate of the smaller political parties. In fact, only two 
parties, namely the DC and the Communist Party or Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), 
managed to preserve their organization structure during the dictatorship. Indeed, the DC 
was able to maintain a relatively strong and functioning organization because it was 
traditionally built on the large network of the Catholic organizations that, as a 
consequence of the 1929 Lateran Pacts, were protected from the regime’s repression. 
More generally, parties with a cohesive organization structure were relatively more 
successful in overcoming the dictatorship period as in the case of the PCI, which 
managed to survive in a covert way while many of his members were in exile. As a 
result, following the breakdown of the Fascist regime, the DC and the PCI were the only 
two large political parties still capable of carrying out the political recruitment function, 
and therefore being able to replace the old guard in the early post-war years. This was not 
the case for smaller parties, like for example the Socialist Party or Partito Socialista 
Italiano (PSI), which instead had to rely on its old political class and was therefore 
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delayed in its attempt to adjust to the new political scenario (see, e.g., Best and Cotta, 
2000 and Henig and Pinder, 1969). 
 
In the 1948 election, which was the first free political election after the Constituent 
Assembly had drafted the Italian Constitution between 1946 and 1948, the DC 
experienced a landslide victory, and lead the first executive of the First Republic with a 
coalition government which also included the Liberals or Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI), 
the Republicans or Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI) and the Social Democrats or 
Partito Social Democratico Italiano (PSDI). From the first election until the 1992 
election, which was the last election of the First Republic under the proportional electoral 
rule, the DC always won the elections, becoming the party of relative (and sometimes 
absolute) majority (see Figure 2). In fact, DC representatives were present in all 47 
governments of the First Republic, and headed the executive in all but six instances (see 
Table 2).11 
 
The DC represented an Italian anomaly as it ruled the country uncontested for almost 
fifty years, yet giving raise to unstable governments – as we can see from Tables 1 and 2, 
from 1948 to 1994, the average duration of a government was around one year, and half 
of the elections took place before the natural end of the Legislature. The other Italian 
anomaly was the existence of an “uncontested” opposition party: the PCI. While always 
at the opposition in the Parliament, the PCI represented the second largest party in the 
country, controlling as much as 36% of the seats in the House in 1976 (see Figure 2), and 
being particularly strong in the central and northern regions of Italy, where the PCI often 
controlled the regional administrations. 
 
The typical organization structure of the parties of the First Republic was composed of 
three distinct levels: national, provincial (or federal), and local. The national structure of 
each party (e.g., the National Council for the DC, or the Central Committee for the PCI 
and the PSI), was elected by the party congress and appointed the party’s directorate and 
                                                          
11 The Republican Giovanni Spadolini from 1981 to 1982, the Socialist Bettino Craxi from 1983 to 1987 
and Giuliano Amato from 1992 to 1993, and a former Governor of the Bank of Italy, Carlo Azelio Ciampi, 
from 1993 to 1994, were the only non-DC politicians who lead a government during the First Republic.  
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secretariat, which controlled the party and ran its operation. The party leader was the 
head of the national secretariat. The provincial committee (e.g., the federal committee for 
the PCI and the PSI) was elected by the provincial congress and also had an executive 
and a provincial secretariat. By and large, the selection of candidates for public office 
took place at the provincial level, although it then needed to be approved by the national 
leadership. The local level was the basic territorial unit of a party, which coordinated the 
party’s activities in each village or city. 
 
Although most features of the recruitment process of politicians differed across the 
political parties of the First Republic, there were also some important common traits. For 
example, albeit with some distinctions, the selection process was mostly under the control 
of the parties’ secretaries (i.e., the parties’ leaders). In addition, the selection process was 
clearly influenced by the electoral law, which provided for open lists for each party and 
the possibility for the voters of casting both a vote for the party list and at the same time a 
(preference) vote for one or more candidates on the party list. Furthermore, almost all the 
parties of the First Republic (with the notable exception of the PCI) relied heavily on the 
public sector for the supply of new politicians. Not only were political parties 
increasingly drawing their recruits from this sector, but parties with a long government 
tradition like the DC were also appointing their members to key positions in publicly 
owned firms and in various public economic agencies (the sottogoverno), creating a 
complex two-ways flow between the public and the political sectors (see, e.g., Galli and 
Prandi, 1970).  
 
Turning to the main differences in the career paths of politicians within the various 
parties of the First Republic, it is again useful to begin by comparing the two main 
parties: the DC and the PCI. In the DC, there was a very small distinction between MPs 
and the party’s national leadership. In fact, election to Parliament was almost regarded as 
a necessary condition to be considered a viable candidate for a leadership position within 
the party. This was not the case for the PCI, where the overlap between national 
leadership and MPs was fairly minimal (see, e.g., Morlino, 2001 and Henig and Pinder, 
1969). In fact, in the PCI holding a parliamentary seat carried a much lower weight 
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within the party than holding a post in the party’s nomenklatura, and switching 
candidatures (i.e., constantly rotating different party members on the electoral lists) was 
common practice. 
 
Holding a post within the party organization at the provincial (or federal) level, on the 
other hand, was an important stepping stone for a successful political career within the 
party both for the DC and the PCI (see, e.g., Galli and Prandi, 1970). At the same time, 
however, professional (career) politicians were relatively less prevalent in the DC than in 
the PCI (where the party structure played an absolutely critical role in the recruitment 
process as well as in every other function performed by the party),12 although a previous 
experience in local public offices was a common trait of most DC and PCI leaders alike. 
The two parties also differed with respect to the background of their politicians and their 
training. In particular, while a large fraction of the DC leaders started their political 
career by holding a post in youth sections of a powerful Catholic organization called 
Catholic Action or Azione Cattolica (see, e.g., Henig and Pinder, 1969), a large 
proportion of the PCI national leaders held a post in the General Confederation of Italian 
Workers (CGIL), one of the largest trade unions in Italy. With respect to the socio-
economic background of its politicians, Galli and Prandi (1970, pp. 148-149) point out 
that while “a political career in the DC was clearly not a vehicle for social mobility for 
workers and peasants, but almost exclusively for the middle status groups […] only in the 
Communist Party were national positions open to party members who had manual 
occupations.” In this respect, it is interesting to note that while the PCI required its 
elected MPs to contribute to the party’s finances by donating a large fraction (40%) of 
their parliamentary wage, the DC did not.  
 
Among the other parties of the First Republic, the PSI was also a mass party very much 
like the DC and the PCI. Indeed, the PSI organization structure was originally similar to 
the one of the PCI, with a marked pyramidal configuration. However, as several scholars 
pointed out, it is important to note that a differentiation along the standard ideological 
                                                          
12 According to the “democratic centralism”, the decisions were taken by the leaders following a top-down 
approach, but rank and file members had to be convinced (see Morlino, 2001). 
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dimension might be very misleading, since in fact there are more similarities between the 
DC and the PSI than between the PSI and the PCI, in particular regarding their 
recruitment process.  
 
The parliamentary history of the PSI can be divided in two different periods. The first 
phase approximately goes until the early 1950s, corresponding to the period when the 
similarities with the PCI were more apparent. The second period begins when the PSI 
became a government party with the first Moro cabinet in 1963. The PSI maintained the 
role of a (minority) government party, aside from some relatively short interludes, until 
the end of the First Republic.  
 
A first important characteristic that differentiated the PSI from the PCI was the 
particularly weak “Party on the Ground” structure (Katz and Mair, 1994).13 The limited 
grassroots participation together with the power of the provincial federations provided a 
fertile ground for the emergence of strong intra-party factions which were a distinct trait 
of the PSI, thus making it more similar to the DC than to the ideologically more 
homogeneous PCI.14 The limited involvement of the rank and file members in the internal 
decision process is also proven by the fact that the delegates to federal or national 
congresses were typically appointed from the party leadership.  
 
In order to be considered as a potential electoral candidate in the national elections, a 
politician needed a training period in the PSI that was typically shorter than the one 
‘imposed’ by the PCI and longer than the one of DC. 15 In the 1960s, with an increasing 
concentration of power at the top, socialization within the party became less important 
and the selection process was completely under control of the party leadership. 
Furthermore, the remarkable overlap between the roles of MPs and PSI party officials, in 
conjunction with the limited grassroots participation, leads some scholars to define the 
                                                          
13 For example, the militants-to-members ratio was in the order of 1:50 for the PSI as compared to 1:23 for 
the DC and 1:18 for the PCI, respectively (see, e.g., Henig and Pinder, 1969 and Morlino, 2001). 
14 The power of internal factions in the PSI was formally acknowledged in its statute in 1959 with the 
adoption of a proportional voting rule for all internal elections. See Morlino (2001). 
15 This is reflected in the percentage of newly elected politicians in the PSI who were affiliated with the 
party before the age of 25, which is typically in between the values for DC and PCI until the 1950s. See 
Best and Cotta (2000). 
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PSI as a propaganda/electoral machine. PSI became increasingly populated of 
professional politicians and local bosses that used the party solely as a mean to win a 
parliamentary seat. The change that occurred with the Craxi’s leadership (1976-93) did 
not generate a reversal in the trend.  
 
The other relevant political parties of the First Republic were the PSDI, the PLI, the PRI, 
and the Social Movement or Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). The first three political 
parties were quite similar in terms of their organization structure. They were all opinion 
parties characterized by a relatively limited number of members. Moreover, they shared a 
strong tradition of being government parties (in particular the PSDI).16 The only party 
that was instead much closer to a mass-party was the MSI (the political party heir of the 
Fascist tradition), which was characterized by a strong central apparatus and leadership. 
Furthermore, a majority of the MSI electoral candidates had a party experience and had 
been also members of its youth organization (the Fronte della Gioventu’ or FdG). 
  
3.2  The political parties of the Second Republic 
Big changes had begun to occur in Italian politics ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 
particular, the events in East Germany contributed to accelerate a transformation that was 
already ongoing in the PCI since the mid 1970s: a gradual shift towards reformist 
positions closer to those of the European Left and towards the overcoming of the 
conventio ad excludendum (i.e., the informal agreement among government parties to 
exclude PCI from any ruling coalition). On February 1991, during its annual Congress, 
the majority of the delegates of the PCI, which was holding 177 seats in the House, chose 
to turn the PCI into a social democratic party. The name (and symbol) was changed to 
Democratic Party of the Left or Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS). Some 
delegates, namely the radical left wing of the PCI chose not to participate in the new 
political entity and to preserve the Communist identity by founding the Party of the 
Communist Rebirth or Rifondazione Comunista (RC) taking with them about ten percent 
                                                          
16 In 1963 the PSDI merged with the PSI forming a unified party, the PSU. The alliance was abandoned in 
1969 after a modest electoral performance. 
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of the PCI members. In the 1992 election, the PDS won 16% of the votes and 107 seats in 
the House, while RC won 5.6% of the votes and 35 seats.  
 
During the April 1992 election, while the corruption scandal was quickly spreading to the 
entire political system, for the first time in their history the DC obtained less than 30% of 
the seats in each chamber of Parliament. Meanwhile, the Northern League or Lega Nord 
(LN), a local party based in the North of Italy, received almost three and a half million 
votes, which translated into 55 seats in the House. The coalition government, which 
included DC, PSI, PSDI and PLI, and was led by the Socialist Giuliano Amato, lasted 
only for one year, and in September of 1992 had to face one of the deepest financial 
crises of the post-WWII Italian history. Following the large support in favor of the 
abrogation of the existing proportional electoral law in the referendum of April 1993, 
Amato resigned. The Parliament was unable to produce a new government, and Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi, a former Governor of the Bank of Italy, was appointed to lead a 
“technical” transition government which was backed by DC, PSI, PSDI, and PLI. 
However, as a consequence of the mounting charges of corruption toward their members 
and a disastrous performance in the local elections, where their electoral vote share 
halved, each of the four parties in the 1992 government coalition was about to disappear, 
while the LN was becoming the strongest political force in northern Italy.  
 
The 1994 elections represented a major turning point for Italian politics. New parties had 
emerged, replacing most of the old parties of the First Republic, and the electoral 
competition was to take place with the new mixed electoral system. Three large and very 
heterogeneous coalitions ran for election. A center coalition, named Pact for Italy or 
Patto per l’Italia, included the Popular Party or Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) which 
was part of the former DC, and parts of the former PSDI, PRI, PLI and PSI, among 
others. A left-wing coalition, named the Party of Progress or Progressisti, included the 
PDS, part of the former PSI, RC, the Green Party, and the Social Christians (which was 
also part of the former DC), among others. A right-wing coalition ran under the two 
different names of Party of Freedoms or Polo delle Libertà in the North and Party of 
Good Government or Polo del Buon Governo in the Centre and the South of Italy. The 
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right-wing coalition was led by Silvio Berlusconi, a media tycoon participating for the 
first time in an election with his party, Forza Italia (FI), and also included LN, National 
Alliance or Alleanza Nazionale (AN), which was the former MSI, and the Christian 
Democratic Party of the Center or Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD), among others. 
The right-wing coalition won the election with 42.8% of the votes, and thanks to the new 
rules in place with the mixed-majoritarian system received 57% of the seats in the House. 
The left-wing coalition obtained 33.8% of the House seats, while the center coalition 
received a mere 7.3%. The composition of the new Parliament demonstrated the 
magnitude of the change, with the largest turnover rate since 1948.  
 
Unlike what happened during the First Republic, where the DC dominated the political 
scene by winning all the elections, in each election since 1994 the ruling party (or more 
precisely the ruling coalition) has always been defeated. Hence, to date, the Second 
Republic has been characterized by two leading coalitions, one stably located in the 
center-left of the political spectrum and the other in the center-right (in spite of the 
frequent changes in their names), alternating in office. In fact, after the political crisis in 
the center-right coalition initiated by the LN, which brought down the first Berlusconi 
government, and the experience of a one-year-long “technical” government led by 
Lamberto Dini (who was a Minister in the previous Berlusconi government), the 1996 
election lead to a change in the balance of power, with the center-left coalition then 
named the Olive Tree or L’Ulivo (ULIVO) led by Romano Prodi obtaining a 
parliamentary majority and hence the control of the executive. After the election in 2001, 
it was then again the turn of the center-right coalition (which included AN, FI, and LN) to 
rule the country, until the 2006 election (which was the first election of the Second 
Republic after the re-introduction of proportional representation), which lead to a new 
change in the leadership in favor of the center-left coalition. The most recent election of 
April 2008 was no exception, as the center-right coalition regained power. 
 
The institutional changes in the electoral rules associated with the transition from the 
First to the Second Republic, together with the aftermath of the large scale corruption 
which wiped out a large part of the previous political elite and created a temporary 
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political vacuum in the Italian political system, has had profound effects on the political 
parties of the Second Republic and the recruiting of new politicians. The entry of a new 
political class coming from the business sector largely modified the political selection 
process. Moreover, the changes in the electoral law altered the existing procedure of 
bargaining over electoral lists and parties’ positions. As a result, the 12th Legislature 
witnessed the entry in politics of a large contingent of young middle class representatives 
from LN, and upper class managers and entrepreneurs from FI. The public sector, which 
throughout the First Republic was the major source of new blood in politics, had been 
replaced in its role by the private sector. An immediate consequence of this phenomenon 
was a marked reversal in the direction taken by the recruitment process that characterized 
the First Republic, with a significant drop in the proportion of professional career 
politicians seating in the Parliament.  
 
Most of the parties of the Second Republic have a similar organization structure, albeit 
with some notable differences. FI was founded in 1993 by Silvio Berlusconi as a fresh 
political movement that distinguishes itself from the past political parties for a less 
structured, in fact minimal, internal organization. Berlusconi imported a managerial 
model prevalent in the private sector into politics: the new organization scheme was 
based on a few hierarchical levels, whose members were mostly recruited among the 
managers and employees of Berlusconi’s companies. For example, FI is the only party 
whose President is also the party leader. The President is appointed by a small 
Presidential Committee and, after 1997, by the National Congress, which is the assembly 
of the party members. The Presidential Committee is the main deliberative body within 
the party and is composed of a majority of members directly appointed by the President 
and a minority appointed by the National Congress. In this respect, a primary 
characteristic of the movement that lead to the creation of FI was the absence of 
professional politicians: the candidates for the 1994 elections were recruited with the 
intent of forming a critical mass of “yes-men” that would legitimate Berlusconi as the 
unquestioned political leader of this group. FI was born as a movement centered on a 
charismatic leadership, almost completely lacking a “Party on the Ground” organization 
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and much closer to an electoral committee than to a traditional political party, (Paolucci, 
2007).17 
 
In terms of the occupational and social background of the FI MPs, the vast majority came 
from free professions, self employment and the private sector. Using Weber’s dichotomy, 
politics seemed more to be an avocation for the MPs of FI than a vocation. One of the 
few characteristics that FI has in common with other more traditional parties is the high 
degree of overlap between party leaders and MPs. Indeed, in the whole period 1994-
2001, only about one third of the Presidential Committee members were not members of 
Parliament.  
 
The selection process in FI is markedly pyramidal and, the predominant feeling among 
elected officials is that their parliamentary careers are almost totally in the hands of 
Berlusconi, who also controlled entry in the national electoral lists (Poli, 2001). However, 
while there is little doubt about FI being the party with the lowest level of political 
professionalization, scholars agree that after a first phase when FI, according to the 
original 1994 statute, exemplified the model of a light party under the founder/leader 
control, elements of a structural change can be detected beginning from the late 1990s. In 
fact, the early termination of the Berlusconi government in 1994, the defeat in the 1996 
elections, and the prospect of remaining at the opposition, increased the need for a more 
stable party structure and an inflow of experienced professional politicians which was 
partly achieved with “lateral moves” from other parties (e.g., the former DC and PSI).18 
Furthermore, there were more recent examples of successful political careers within the 
party (as opposed to the traditional practice of horizontal cooptation) with the candidacy 
of several local coordinators in the 2001 elections.  With respect to the party’s finances, it 
                                                          
17 According to Morlino (2001, p. 129), “[…] in Forza Italia, members are components of local electoral 
committees or promoters of a “product,” centered around the leader and founder of the party, with no role 
to play outside election campaigns.” Some scholars refer to FI as “the party of the elected 
(representatives)”. 
18 As Mannheimer (1994) among others suggests, FI originates as a party machine conceived to win 
elections and it is therefore structurally unprepared to take a defeat.  
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is worth mentioning that since 2003, FI requires its MPs to give back to the party an 
amount of approximately 1,000 Euros per month out of their parliamentary wage.19  
 
A second important political force of the Second Republic is represented by the parties 
that formed from the ashes of the former PCI. As we already mentioned before, the PCI 
changed his name to PDS in 1991, and again to Democrats of the Left or Democratici di 
Sinistra (DS) in 1998. After the 1991 splinter of the RC, a new splinter occurred in 1998 
when the majority of the RC decided to withdraw their support to the centre-left coalition 
and a minority of the party, which instead kept supporting the Prodi government, founded 
the Party of the Italian Communists or Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI) taking with 
them about one fourth of the RC members. 
 
Although the monolithic structure of the mass party was only a vague memory, the PDS 
managed to preserve a grassroots organization similar to the PCI at least in the first half 
of the 1990s. However, after 1998 the DS party structure resembled that of a modern 
cadre party (Koole, 1994), characterized by a strong leadership with a substantive 
presence of professional politicians and a low members-to-voters ratio. At the same time, 
it maintained a structure with vertical ties, which is typical of a mass party. 
 
Regarding candidate selection, there is evidence of a clear transformation from the 
absolute centrality of the party structure in the recruitment process (that characterized the 
PCI experience) to a more open and less hierarchical system fostering a larger 
participation of rank and files members and supporters in the decision process. For 
example, the 2001 DS statute provided for open primaries, closed primaries and 
cooptation as possible selection methods, with a very limited use of the latter as 
compared to methods of nomination from below. Furthermore, since the second half of 
the 1990s, the political career paths started in local public offices gained the same dignity 
of the traditional cursus honorum within the party. The most recent statute also requires 
                                                          
19 See Paolucci (2007) and also an interview with MP Ferrigno which can be found at 
http://www.mclink.it/com/inform/art/07n18617.htm 
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an equal representation of men and women (at least 40% of each gender) in the electoral 
lists.  
 
In the transition from the PDS to DS, there was an increase in the overlap between the 
MP role and the party leadership: from a proportion of 45% MPs in the 1991 National 
Secretary to more than 50% in 2001, and from about one fifth of the 1991 National 
Direction to one third in 2001 (De Rosa, 2007). At the same time, the presence of the 
party inside the government became substantial, with more than 50% of the cabinet posts 
held by PDS-DS MPs in the governments that formed between 1996 and 2000 (Prodi I, 
D’Alema I and II, Amato II). The obvious overall effect was a marked drop in the 
political weight of party officials.  
 
RC moved away from the PCI tradition of democratic centralism, which also 
corresponded to a weakening of the National Political Committee’s role in the 
candidates’ selection process. Moreover, in order to foster political turnover, in RC an 
outgoing MPs cannot run again after a second term (with the exception of the National 
Secretary of the party). The RC statute also prescribes that the majority of the National 
Secretary must be composed of non-elected party officials and in fact the percentage of 
MPs in the National Secretary was around 11% in 2005.  
 
With respect to MPs’ contributions to the party, the most recent DS statute provides for a 
contribution of 40% of the parliamentary wage. Moreover, MPs are required to give back 
15% of their severance pay to the party. Regarding the RC, the MPs’ contributions to the 
party decreased from 60% of the parliamentary wage in 1991 to 20% in 2003-04 
(Bertolino, 2004).  
 
A third major political force of the Second Republic is AN, which was born during the 
17th MSI national congress in January 1995. The need for a new right-wing political 
entity that was fully integrated within the democratic system of political forces (arco 
constituzionale) was already clear at the end of the 1980s, when the MSI was 
experiencing a decline of its electoral support. The transformation became almost a 
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necessity with the change of the electoral law in the 1990s, which would have severely 
penalized the relatively small and isolated parties. The idea was to soften the more radical 
position of the MSI in order to create a new political movement able to attract the right-
wing component of the former DC and, more importantly, a political entity able to 
propose itself as a government party. The timing of the transition was strategic since it 
shortly followed the remarkable and somewhat unexpected success (given its proportion) 
of the MSI in the 1993 local elections. The success of the transformation was evidenced 
by the participation of AN in the first Berlusconi government and by the creation of a 
splinter party the MSI-FT, which maintained the Fascist legacy.  
 
The transition from the MSI to AN can be described as a change from a mass party to a 
modern movement party (Morlino, 2001). Indeed, there are several elements of continuity 
with the tradition of mass parties: a top-down recruitment mechanism (while the National 
Direction is responsible for approving the lists proposed by the Provincial Executive, the 
President of the party is in fact the ultimate decision maker); an experience within the 
party or as a local administrator as an important stepping stone for a successful political 
career; and some overlap between public and central office positions (more than one third 
of the members of the National Secretary’s Office were MPs).  
 
Another important phenomenon of the Second Republic is the emergence of regional 
parties advocating a variety of local issues from fiscal federalism to secession. This 
phenomenon actually began in Veneto and Piedmont (two regions that were under the 
DC control until 1987) in the early 1980s, and then spread over to Lombardy. The party 
LN was born as a federation of several autonomist groups and regional parties (e.g., Lega 
Lombarda and Liga Veneta) in 1991. In 1994 the LN became the second largest 
parliamentary party after the PDS. Under the first Berlusconi government the LN secured 
five Ministers (including the internal affairs cabinet) and the Speaker of the House. 
However, more than half of the elected MPs left the party in the first months of 1995 
joining the ranks of FI. In 1996, the LN withdrew the support to the second Berlusconi 
government and run alone in the 1996 political elections securing 10% of votes at the 
national level (a remarkable result for a party with a regional base). 
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The LN is characterized by a markedly hierarchical structure, a strong leader and by the 
centrality of the party apparatus. Some scholars consider the LN as a hybrid party 
somewhat in between an updated version of the mass party and a modern cadre party 
without a professional leadership (Morlino, 2001). Political recruitment follows a top-
down approach and it is almost completely under the control of the Federal Council. The 
MPs typically have some experience as grassroots activists in regional parties, and they 
also hold posts in central offices (from 7% to 30% of MPs among top party officials with 
a maximum of 55% in 1994). 
 
In addition to the major political parties we mentioned above, a number of post-DC 
parties were formed during the Second Republic after the crisis that swept the DC in 
1992-1994. The 1994 mixed majoritarian electoral rule favored the formation of large 
coalition of parties on opposite sides of the political spectrum, and tailed off the political 
weight of the center thus making the political unity of the Catholics a feature of the past. 
With the exception of the PPI, which was born in 1994 in the desperate attempt of 
revamping the DC legacy, the other newly formed Catholic parties (CCD, CDU, 
UDEUR, DL) are essentially “elite parties”, with an evanescent organizational structure 
more similar to electoral committees supporting single political figures (Morlino, 2001). 
The elected politicians typically come from a career in the public sector and hold 
positions both in the Parliament and in the party leadership. Since 1994, the partisan 
composition of all of the ruling coalitions contained at least one of these Catholic parties. 
 
4. The role of trade unions 
Trade unions have historically been an important player in the Italian political arena. 
With a coverage rate well above 80% of the Italian work-force, unions have been 
responsible for bargaining most of the labor contracts both in the private and public 
sector throughout the post-war period. Furthermore, they enjoyed a strong support among 
the workers. The union density (measured by the rate of union membership among the 
Italian workers) has varied between 50% in the late 1970s and 30% at the beginning of 
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the 21st century, following a decreasing trend which is common to most industrialized 
countries. 
 
The strong ties between the trade unions and the political system can also be seen in the 
political careers that several of the most representative leaders of trade union 
organizations undertook after leaving their positions within these organizations. Perhaps 
the first secretary general of a trade union to seat in the Parliament was Giuseppe Di 
Vittorio. He was elected secretary of the CGIL in 1945 and became a member of the 
Italian Parliament in its Constituent Assembly in 1946 with the PCI. Notably, he never 
resigned from his post in the CGIL. From their post of secretary general of the CGIL, all 
subsequent trade unionists after Di Vittorio (namely Agostino Novella, Luciano Lama, 
Antonio Pizzinato and Bruno Trentin) were also elected to the Parliament with the PCI; 
while Sergio Cofferati, who led the CGIL from 1994 to 2002, was elected Mayor of 
Bologna with the centre-left coalition of the ULIVO in 2004 (see Table 3). 
  
The recruitment of politicians from among the top trade unionists occurred also for the 
Catholic union CISL. Of the seven general secretaries who ended their mandate between 
1950 and 2006, six became member of the Parliament with the DC and later the center-
left coalitions of the Second Republic. In addition, Pierre Carniti has been a member of 
the European Parliament in two Legislatures between 1989 and 1999, with the PSI in his 
former mandate and with the PDS in the latter one.  
 
The third largest Italian trade union, UIL, which was founded by the PRI and the PSDI, 
also had strong ties with the political system, although its leaders were slightly less 
successful in their political aspirations to be elected to the Parliament. Among the six 
general secretaries leading the union since 1952, only three, i.e., Italo Viglianesi, Pietro 
Larizza and Giorgio Benvenuto, eventually become members of the Parliament. 
Viglianesi was elected to the Senate and later became Minister, Benvenuto, who was 
secretary of the PSI in 1993, was elected to the House in the DS lists, while Larizza 
became senator for the DS in 2007. 
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Table 1: Italy’s Legislatures (1948-2008) 
Legislature Date begins Date ends 
I May 8, 1948 June 24, 1953 
II June 25, 1953 June 11, 1958 
III June 12, 1958 May 15, 1963 
IV May 16, 1963 June 4, 1968 
V June 5, 1968 May 24, 1972 
VI May 25, 1972 July 4, 1976 
VII July 5, 1976 June 19, 1979 
VIII June 20, 1979 July 11, 1983 
IX July 12, 1983 July 1, 1987 
X July 2, 1987 April 22, 1992 
XI April 23, 1992 April 14, 1994 
XII April 15, 1994 May 8, 1996 
XIII May 9, 1996 May 29, 2001 
XIV May 30, 2001 April 27, 2006 
XV April 28, 2006 April 28, 2008 
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Table 2: Italy’s governments (1948-2008) 
Government Date begins Date ends Coalition Legislature Republic 
De Gasperi V May 23, 1948 January 14, 1950 DC, PLI, PSDI, PRI I I 
De Gasperi VI January 27, 1950 January 19, 1951 DC, PSDI, PRI I I 
De Gasperi VII July 26, 1951 July 7, 1953 DC, PRI I I 
De Gasperi VIII July 16, 1953 August 2, 1953 DC II I 
Pella August 17, 1953 January 12, 1954 DC, Ind. II I 
Fanfani I January 18, 1954 February 8, 1954 DC II I 
Scelba February 10, 1954 July 2, 1955 DC, PSDI, PLI II I 
Segni July 6, 1955 May 15, 1957 DC, PSDI, PLI II I 
Zoli May 19, 1957 July 1, 1958 DC II I 
Fanfani II July 1, 1958 February 15, 1959 DC, PSDI III I 
Segni II February 15, 1959 March 23, 1960 DC III I 
Tambroni March 25, 1960 July 26, 1960 DC III I 
Fanfani III July 26, 1960 February 21, 1962 DC III I 
Fanfani IV February 21, 1962 June 21, 1963 DC, PSDI, PRI III I 
Leone I June 21, 1963 December 4, 1963 DC IV I 
Moro I December 4, 1963 July 22, 1964 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI IV I 
Moro II July 22, 1964 February 23, 1966 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI IV I 
Moro III February 23, 1966 June 24, 1968 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI IV I 
Leone II June 24, 1968 December 12, 1968 DC V I 
Rumor I December 12, 1968 August 5, 1969 DC, PSI, PRI V I 
Rumor II August 5, 1969 March 27, 1970 DC V I 
Rumor III March 27, 1970 August 6, 1970 DC, PSU, PSI, PRI V I 
Colombo August 6, 1970 February 17, 1972 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI V I 
Andreotti I February 17, 1972 June 26, 1972 DC V I 
Andreotti II July 26, 1972 July 7, 1973 DC, PLI, PSDI VI I 
Rumor IV July 7, 1973 March 14, 1974 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI VI I 
Rumor V March 14, 1974 Novemebr 23, 1974 DC, PSI, PSDI VI I 
Moro IV Novemebr 23, 1974 February 12, 1976 DC, PRI VI I 
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Moro V February 12, 1976 July 29, 1976 DC VI I 
Andreotti III July 29, 1976 March 11, 1978 DC VII I 
Andreotti IV March 11, 1978 March 20, 1979 DC VII I 
Andreotti V March 20, 1979 August 4, 1979 DC, PRI, PSDI VII I 
Cossiga I August 4, 1979 April 4, 1980 DC, PSDI, PLI VIII I 
Cossiga II April 4, 1980 October 18, 1980 DC, PSI, PRI VIII I 
Forlani October 18, 1980 June 28, 1981 DC, PSI, PRI, PSDI VIII I 
Spadolini I June 28, 1981 August 23, 1982 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI VIII I 
Spadolini II August 23, 1982 December 1, 1982 DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI VIII I 
Fanfani V December 1, 1982 August 4, 1983 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI VIII I 
Craxi I August 4, 1983 August 1, 1986 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI IX I 
Craxi II August 1, 1986 April 17, 1987 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI IX I 
Fanfani VI April 17, 1987 July 28, 1987 DC, Ind. IX I 
Goria July 28, 1987 April 13, 1988 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI X I 
De Mita April 13, 1988 July 22, 1989 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI X I 
Andreotti VI July 22, 1989 April 12, 1991 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI X I 
Andreotti VII April 12, 1991 April 24, 1992 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI X I 
Amato I June 28, 1992 April 28, 1993 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI XI I 
Ciampi April 28, 1993 May 10, 1994 DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI, Ind. XI I 
Berlusconi I May 10, 1994 January 17, 1995 Center-right XII II 
Dini January 17, 1995 May 17, 1996 Technical XII II 
Prodi I May 17, 1996 October 21, 1998 Centre-left XIII II 
D'alema I October 21, 1998 December 18, 1999 Centre-left XIII II 
D'alema II December 22, 1999 April 25, 2000 Centre-left XIII II 
Amato II April 25, 2000 June 11, 2001 Centre-left XIII II 
Berlusconi II June 11, 2001 April 23, 2005 Centre-right XIV II 
Berlusconi III April 23, 2005 May 17, 2006 Centre-right XIV II 
Prodi II May 17, 2006 April 28, 2008 Centre-right XV II 
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Table 3: Political careers of trade union leaders 
Name Union Secretary general MP Party 
Giulio Pastore CISL 1950-1958 Yes DC 
Bruno Storti CISL 1958-1977 Yes DC 
Luigi Macario CISL 1977-1979 Yes DC 
Pierre Carniti CISL 1979-1985 No  
Franco Marini CISL 1985-1991 Yes ULIVO 
Sergio D'Antoni CISL 1991-2000 Yes ULIVO 
Savino Pezzotta CISL 2000-2006 Yes UNIONE 
Raffaele Bonanni CISL 2006- No  
Giuseppe Di Vittorio CGIL 1944-1957 Yes PCI 
Agostino Novella CGIL 1957-1970 Yes PCI 
Luciano Lama CGIL 1970-1986 Yes PCI 
Antonio Pizzinato CGIL 1986-1988 Yes PDS 
Bruno Trentin CGIL 1988-1994 Yes PCI 
Sergio Cofferati CGIL 1994-2002 No ULIVO 
Guglielmo Epifani CGIL 2002- No  
Italo Viglianesi UIL 1953-1969 Yes PSU 
Lino Ravecca UIL 1969-1971 No  
Ruggero Ravenna UIL 1969-1971 No  
Raffaele Vanni UIL 1969-1976 No  
Giorgio Benvenuto UIL 1976-1992 Yes DS 
Pietro Larizza UIL 1992-2000 Yes DS 
Luigi Angeletti UIL 2000-  No  
 
 34
Figure 1: Number of parties represented in the Parliament
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CHAPTER II: Stylized facts 
 
This study uses a newly collected, unique, longitudinal data set which contains detailed 
information on all individuals who have been elected to the Camera dei Deputati of the 
Italian Parliament (the House), since the inception of the Italian Republic in 1948. The 
data span 60 years (1948-2008), 15 Legislatures, and the two Republics (Italy’s First 
Republic, from 1948 to 1994, and the Second Republic, which began with the election of 
the 12th Legislature in 1994).  
 
In addition to comprehensive information on individuals’ demographic characteristics 
(such as their age, gender and education), their last occupation prior to entering 
Parliament, and their electoral history and record of service in Parliament (including, 
possibly, election to the Senate, committee membership and government positions), our 
data set also contains partial information on legislators’ attendance of parliamentary 
voting sessions (for Legislatures VIII-XV), their annual income from their tax returns 
(from 1981 to 2006), their involvement in scandals (from 1948 to 1994), and their 
occupation after leaving Parliament (for a representative sub-sample of individuals). 
Details on the collection of the data and the sources we used are contained in the 
Appendix. 
 
In this chapter, we use these data to establish a number of interesting stylized facts 
pertaining to the careers of Italian politicians. Whenever possible, we also draw a 
comparison with the U.S.  
 
1. Career profiles 
Our data document several important aspects of the career profiles of 4,465 Italian 
legislators, from the time they enter the House to when they either leave Parliament or the 
sample ends (387 individuals in our sample were re-elected to the 16th Legislature in 
April 2008).  
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The overwhelming majority of politicians (82.9%) spend their entire parliamentary career 
in the House. A small fraction (4.1%) goes from the Senate to the House. The remaining 
13% moves from the House to the Senate during the course of their legislative tenure 
(with 1.1% eventually returning to the House). Most politicians (89.4%) have 
uninterrupted parliamentary careers, while 9.9% of them exit and reenter once (multiple 
reentries are extremely rare).  
 
The average duration of a (complete) parliamentary career is 10.6 years or 2.5 
Legislatures, with a standard deviation of 7.6 years or 1.8 Legislatures (the median 
duration is 9 years or 2 Legislatures). Over a third of all politicians (36.2 %) remain in 
Parliament for only one term, and only 11% have parliamentary careers that last longer 
than 20 years. Male legislators (who represent 90.2% of the sample) tend to have longer 
parliamentary tenure (10.8 years or 2.5 Legislatures on average) than female legislators 
(whose parliamentary careers last 8.5 years or 2.1 Legislatures on average).  
 
The fraction of legislators who die in office is 4.8%, and 0.1% become President of the 
Italian Republic and/or senator for life. Of the remaining legislators with complete 
parliamentary careers, 58.7% leave office without seeking reelection (while the other 
41.3% fail to be reelected). The fraction of politicians seeking reelection has declined 
steadily over time from 91.4% at the end of the first Legislature (in 1953), to 85% in 
1972 to a record low of 50.8% at the end of Italy’s First Republic in 1994. During the 
Second Republic, this fraction has oscillated between 66% and 78%. Reelection rates, on 
the other hand, have increased during the First Republic from 71.3% in 1953, to 86% in 
1987, before declining to 60.5% in 1994. During the Second Republic, reelection rates 
have increased from 70.5% in 1996 to 77.1% in 2006, before dropping to 65% in the 
most recent election. These patterns are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
The overall parliamentary turnover rate (measured by the fraction of new entrants) over 
the period 1953-2008 is equal to 40%.20 In the second Legislature (1953-58), it was equal 
                                                          
20 Since 1948 was the beginning of the First Republic, the proportion of new entrants in Legislature I was 
100%.  
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to 37.6%, and it reached its minimum level of 26.3% in the 8th Legislature (1979-1983). 
In the 12th Legislature (1994-1996), which marked the beginning of Italy’s Second 
Republic, the turnover rate spiked at 69.5%, and has been roughly constant at around 45-
50% ever since (see Figure 1). 
 
To provide a term of comparison, Figure 2 illustrates the fraction of legislators seeking 
reelection at the end of a term, their reelection rates, and the overall turnover rate in the 
U.S. House of Representatives during the period 1951-1994 (U.S. Congress 81-103).21 
Note that the duration of a House term in the U.S. is fixed and equal to two years. As we 
can see from comparing Figure 2 to Figure 1 both the fraction of legislators who seek 
reelection at the end of a term and their reelection rates are systematically lower in Italy 
than in the U.S. As a result, turnover rates are significantly higher. Interestingly, 
however, the duration of (complete) congressional careers of U.S. legislators is 
comparable to that of Italian legislators, and is equal to 10.4 years on average, with a 
standard deviation of 7.7 years and a median duration of 8 years. The fraction of U.S. 
legislators who have congressional careers that last longer than 20 years (10%) is nearly 
the same as in Italy (11%). Differences across genders are also similar in the two 
countries, with male U.S. legislators having longer congressional careers (10.5 years on 
average) than female U.S. legislators (whose parliamentary careers last 7.9 years on 
average). However, in the U.S., the fraction of House members who remain in Congress 
for only one term (20%) is lower than the corresponding figure for Italy (36.2%).   
 
Another interesting question we can address with our data is whether the characteristics 
of the Italian politicians who are elected to Parliament have changed over time. To assess 
the extent to which such change may have occurred, we focus on the composition of the 
cohorts of new House entrants in each of the 15 Legislatures from 1948 to 2006. Figure 3 
plots the patterns in the average age at first entry, the percentage of new legislators who 
are women and the percentage with a college degree (“Laurea”) which we observe in the 
data. As we can see from this figure, the composition of the cohorts of new House 
                                                          
21 The U.S. data we use here is from the study of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004, 2005). Their data set 
contains detailed information on all individuals who served in the U.S. Congress between 1947 and 1994.  
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entrants has changed greatly over the years along each of these three dimensions.  The 
average age at entry, which was equal to 45.8 years at the beginning of the first 
Legislature, declined to 42.7 in the 7th Legislature (1976), and then started to rise 
monotonically to reach 50 in the 15th Legislature (2006). The fraction of women in the 
cohorts of new entrants has almost tripled between 1948 and 2006, from 7.2% to 20.8%. 
The smallest percentage, 1.7%, was in the cohort that first entered the House during the 
5th Legislature (1968-1972). The average level of education in the cohorts of new entrants 
has also changed dramatically over time. The percentage of new entrants with a college 
degree, which was equal to 91.4% at the beginning of the first Legislature, has been 
declining monotonically over time, and was equal to only 64.6% in the cohort that 
entered the House for the first time in 2006. Focusing on the differences between the 
cohorts of politicians who first entered Parliament during the First Republic (1948-1992) 
and the Second Republic (1994-2006), we document that the average age at entry has 
increased from 44.7 to 48.1, the fraction of women has also increased from 8% to 13.9%, 
while the percentage of politicians with a college degree has declined from 80.5% to 
68.5%. It is also interesting to point out that while the average age at entry of both men 
and women has increased from the First to the Second Republic (from 45 to 48.3 years 
for men and from 41.1 to 46.5 years for women), and the percentage of legislators with a 
college degree is lower in the Second Republic than it was in the First Republic (when 
the percentages were 80.1% for men and 75.1% for women) for either gender, during the 
Second Republic a larger percentage of female legislators has a college degree (70.1%) 
than their male counterparts (68.2%) 
 
To assess whether the trends we observe for Italy are indicative of a more general 
phenomenon, in Figure 4 we plot the patterns in the average age at first entry, the 
percentage of female new legislators and the percentage of entering legislators with a 
college degree (“Bachelor”) in the U.S. data. With the exception of the fraction of women 
in the cohorts of new entrants to Congress, which displays a similar, increasing pattern as 
the one we observe for Italy, the trends we observe in the other two variables for the U.S. 
are quite different. In fact, the fraction of individuals first elected to the U.S. Congress 
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who have a college degree steadily increases over time (from 88.5% in 1947 to 93.9% in 
1993), while the average age at first entry remains fairly stable at around 47.5 years. 
 
Turning attention to how the professional background of Italian legislators has evolved 
over time, we classify the last occupation held by an individual prior to entering 
Parliament into twelve broad categories, which correspond to their sector of employment 
and/or type of occupation. The categories we consider are: agriculture (e.g., farmers), 
education (e.g., teachers and professors), health care (i.e., doctors), industry workers (i.e., 
blue-collar and white-collar workers), industry managers (i.e., middle-management and 
executives), legal (e.g., lawyers and judges), lobbying (i.e., trade unions officials), media 
(e.g., journalists), military (i.e., professional soldiers), political (e.g., party officials), 
public (e.g., employees of public firms), and self-employment (e.g., consultants and small 
entrepreneurs). We also add an additional category to account for individuals who, prior 
to entering Parliament, are out of the labor force.  Table 1 summarizes the distribution of 
occupations held by individuals prior to entering Parliament for each of the 15 cohorts of 
new entrants, as well as for the overall sample, the samples of men and women, and the 
samples of politicians who entered Parliament during the First and the Second Republic. 
Several interesting patterns emerge from the table. The fraction of new entrants coming 
from the legal sector has declined steadily from 33.9% in the first Legislature to 10.6% in 
the cohort entering the 15th Legislature. While always relatively small, the fraction of 
new entrants coming from the agriculture sector has also declined. On the contrary, the 
fraction of newly elected legislators with prior work experience in the industrial sector 
(regardless of the type of job) has increased from 12.4% in the first Legislature to 26.3% 
in the 14th Legislature (2001-06). At the same time, the composition of the group of new 
entrants coming form the industrial sector has also changed over time, as the fraction of 
workers decreased from 6.3% to 5%, while the fraction of managers increased from 6.1% 
to 18.2% between Legislatures I and XV. The fraction of new entrants with a background 
in the political sector and the fraction of new entrants with a background in the public 
sector have also grown from 1.7% and 2.4% in the first Legislature to 15.2% and 6% in 
the 15th Legislature, respectively, although their patterns have been non-monotonic. 
Another variable which displays an interesting non-monotonic pattern, is the fraction of 
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entering legislators coming from trade unions (the lobbying sector), which more than 
doubled (from about 5% to 11%) over the course of the first four Legislatures, but then 
dropped in the early 1970s and has been fluctuating around 3% since then. On the other 
hand, the relative prevalence of other occupations within each cohort of new legislators 
(like for example the fraction of people working in the media, the education, and the 
health care sector, as well as the self-employed), has remained fairly stable over time.   
 
Overall, looking at the extent to which the composition of Parliament has changed 
between the First and the Second Republic with respect to the professional background of 
its members, we observe the following percentage changes (averaged over all of the 
cohorts of new entrants in each of the two Republics): agriculture -1 percentage point, 
education -1.1, health care +3.1, industrial workers -4.5, industrial managers +11.5, legal 
-6.3, lobbying -4.3, media -2.4, military -0.5, political +2.6, public +0.2, self-employment 
+1.1 and out of the labor force +1.4 percentage points. It is also interesting to note that 
37.3% of all female legislators come from the education sector (compared to only 17.5% 
of all male legislators), only 5.3% from the legal sector (the corresponding figure for men 
is 20.4%), and although the overall fractions of female and male legislators coming form 
the industrial sector are comparable (19.7% for men and 17.9% for women), relatively 
more female legislators hold lower-level (blue-collar and white-collar) jobs prior to 
entering Parliament (11.5%) than male legislators (8%), while the opposite is true with 
respect to managerial occupations (6.5% for women and 11.6% for men). These patterns 
of differences in the occupation background of male and female legislators are similar in 
the First and the Second Republic. 
 
Some peculiar features of the Italian labor market, in particular the presence of a very 
large public sector and professional party officials who hold regular, paid full-time jobs 
within various political organizations, make it hard to compare the professional 
background of Italian and U.S. legislators. Nevertheless, Table 2 reports the percentages 
of individuals who worked in the legal and the business sector prior to entering the U.S. 
Congress for each of the 24 cohorts of new entrants over the period 1947-1994. As we 
can see from this table, in spite of the large differences in the levels, the U.S. data also 
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displays a sharply declining trend in the fraction of legislators coming from the legal 
sector, which is similar to the one we observe in the Italian data. On the other hand, the 
fraction of newly elected legislators with prior work experience in the business sector is 
quite different in Italy and the U.S., both in levels and with respect to its trend over time. 
In fact, in the U.S. this fraction has remained fairly stable over the years ranging between 
15 and 20%.  
 
In addition to the last occupation held prior to being elected to the Italian Parliament, 
which we observe for 4,317 individuals out of the 4,465 in the population of legislators 
elected to the House between 1947 and 2007, for a representative sample of 860 
individuals (768 men and 92 women) our data set also contains information on their 
occupation after exiting Parliament. The average age at exit in the sample is equal to 56 
years, which is the same as the average age at exit in the population of legislators with 
complete parliamentary histories. The fraction of people in the sample who retire at the 
end of their parliamentary career is 5.6%, while 2.7% end up in jail. Using the same 
classification as before, the distribution of post-Parliament occupations for the remaining 
individuals in the sample is summarized in Table 3, for the overall sample as well as the 
samples of men and women. When compared with the distributions of pre-Parliament 
occupations contained in Table 1, the figures reported in Table 3 suggest a dramatic shift 
away from most private sector occupations and into the political sector, both in the 
overall sample as well as for each gender.  
 
To explore this issue further, Table 4 reports the pre-Parliament to post-Parliament 
occupation transition matrix for the sample of individuals for whom we observe both 
occupations.22 There are three quantitatively most striking phenomena that emerge from 
this table. First, most legislators (57.4%) do not return to the occupation they had before 
entering Parliament at the end of their parliamentary tenure. Second, the category of 
people who are least likely to return to their previous occupation after exit from 
Parliament (4.3%) is that of workers in the industry sector. In fact, 17% of them do return 
                                                          
22 Since the agriculture sector and the military account for less than 1% of the observations, we drop them 
from Table 4. Also, the number of observations for former female legislators is too small to produce 
separate transition matrices for each gender that would have statistical meaning.  
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to the industry sector, but in managerial occupations. Third, politics appears to be an 
absorbing state. A large fraction of individuals who prior to entering Parliament were 
working in other sectors, after exiting Parliament end up taking another political job. This 
fraction varies from 28.1% for individuals whose pre-Parliament occupation was in the 
legal sector, to 37.5% for people with managerial occupations in the industry sector, to 
49.1% for people coming from self-employment, to 54.9% for people coming from the 
public sector, to 61.2% for people with a background as regular employees in the 
industrial sector. At the same time, 74.2% of the individuals who prior to entering 
Parliament were already in the political sector continue their post-Parliament career in 
that sector, and only 21% switch to the private sector (with the remaining 4.8% taking a 
job in the public sector). Of all the former members of Parliament who remain in politics, 
21.5% are elected or appointed to a public office at the local (i.e., city or province) level, 
14.3% at the regional level and 10.6% at the national level. The remaining 53.6% takes a 
position within a party organization.   
 
Interestingly, although as we pointed out before the Italian and U.S. data on occupations 
are not directly comparable, in the U.S. we observe the exact opposite phenomenon. 
Namely, a much larger fraction of the former members of Congress who do not retire 
after exiting have post-congressional careers in the private sector (59.8%) rather than 
taking another political job (40.2%). The fraction of U.S. legislators who retire after 
exiting Congress is also higher (13%) than the corresponding figure for their Italian 
counterparts, although their average age at exit is the same (56 years). 
 
2. Incomes 
In Italy, the (before-tax) real annual parliamentary wage (“indennita’ parlamentare”) in 
2005 Euros has increased from 10,712 Euros in 1948 to 137,691 Euros in 2006 (an 
overall growth of 1,185.4%), at an average annual growth rate of 9.9% (Figure 5). In the 
U.S., the (before-tax) real annual congressional wage in 2005 Dollars has increased from 
101,297 Dollars in 1948 to 160,038 Dollars in 2006 (an overall growth of 58%), at an 
average annual growth rate of 1.5% (Figure 6). Over the same period of time, Italy’s real 
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GDP per-capita grew 449.5%, at an average annual growth rate of 3.2%, and the U.S. real 
GDP per-capita grew 241.7%, at an average annual growth rate of 2.1%.  
 
As we can see from Figures 5 and 6, both countries experienced a period of sharp, 
sustained growth in the real wage of its legislators in the 1960s, followed by a significant 
drop during the 1970s (mainly due to the high inflation during that decade). However, 
while in the U.S. the real congressional wage has remained essentially constant after 
1980, the real parliamentary wage in Italy has been growing at an average annual rate of 
3.9% since 1980.23  
 
To facilitate further comparisons between the two countries, in Figure 7 we plot the 
difference between the real annual wage of Italian and U.S. legislators in 2005 Euros 
(calculated after converting 2005 Dollars into 2005 Euros using the 2005 average real 
exchange rate of 0.7 Euros per Dollar). As we can see from this figure, during the First 
Republic, Italian legislators were underpaid relative to their U.S. counterparts until the 
late 1980s, although the gap was closing down throughout the 1980s. Since 1994, 
however, that is since the beginning of the Second Republic, we observe the opposite 
phenomenon. The real annual wage of the members of the Italian Parliament exceeds that 
of the members of the U.S. Congress, and the gap increased during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. 
 
There are several important considerations that are relevant for the interpretation of the 
evidence presented in Figures 5-7. While 1948 marks the dawn of the Italian Republic 
and the election of its first Parliament, by that time the U.S. political system was already 
a well established democracy with a stable institutional structure. In particular, while 
politics was for all practical purposes an employment sector in the U.S. and being a 
member of Congress a full-time job, the same was not true in Italy. Most importantly, 
unlike U.S. legislators, Italian legislators were allowed to keep their regular jobs outside 
of Parliament (except for employment in other public or private institutions controlled by 
                                                          
23 Note that in both countries, the parliamentary or congressional wage is determined by the legislature 
itself which every year votes on its own compensation. 
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the government, either directly or indirectly, or other full-time salaried occupations),24 in 
part not to cause an economic harm to them due to the relatively low wage they were 
receiving as elected members of Parliament. After 1965, however, the economic 
treatment of Italian legislators started to improve dramatically, not only relative to their 
U.S. counterparts, but also relative to other private-sector occupations in Italy, thus 
making the case for allowing legislators to earn additional income from activities outside 
of Parliament practically moot. In fact, as we can see from Figure 8, by 1985 the annual 
real parliamentary wage of an Italian legislator (84,229 Euros) was 4.2 times larger than 
the average real annual earnings of an Italian private-sector worker (20,268 Euros).25 In 
2004, at 146,533 Euros, it was 6.5 times the average real annual earnings of a private-
sector worker (22,712 Euros).26 Nevertheless, to date Italian legislators can still 
supplement their parliamentary wage with additional income from extra-parliamentary 
activities (which instead is not allowed in the U.S., except for a relatively small 
allowance).27 
 
Since 1982, the Italian law requires all elected officials to disclose their annual tax 
returns, which we collected as part of our data.28 Since tax returns refer to incomes 
earned in the previous calendar year our data set contains information on the total 
(reported) income of all House legislators between 1981 and 2006. In addition, for 2,009 
individuals who were first elected to the House on or after 1983, we observe their income 
in the year before they enter Parliament. We are therefore in a unique position to address 
                                                          
24 Exclusion restrictions for employment of current members of Parliament are regulated by the Italian Law 
number 60 of February 13, 1953. 
25 The data on annual earnings in the private sector by type of occupation come for the administrative 
payroll records of INPS, the Italian Social Security Administration. These data are only available for the 
period 1985-2004. Average annual earnings are calculated for the samples of full-time workers in each 
occupation.  
26 All real incomes are in 2005 Euros. 
27 In addition, Italian legislators also receive a number of allowances (e.g., per-diem reimbursements for 
each day they are in Parliament and lump-sum monthly payments for expenses related to their interaction 
with the voters, among others). Since these allowances are not considered part of their income, we do not 
include them in our analysis. See, however, Rizzo and Stella (2007).  
28 Italian Law number 441 of July 5, 1982. 
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a number of questions that pertain to the extra-parliamentary income of legislators, both 
prior to and during their tenure in Parliament.29 
 
Figures 9 and 10 summarize the distribution of the real annual incomes (in 2005 Euros) 
prior to entering Parliament for each cohort of new entrants in Legislatures IX-XV, both 
in levels (Figure 9) and as a percentage of the parliamentary wage (Figure 10). To offer a 
term of comparison, Figure 11 summarizes the evolution of the distribution of the real 
annual earnings of all Italian salaried workers in the private sector (which include blue-
collar workers, white-collar workers and managers), between 1985 and 2004 (also in 
2005 Euros). There are several interesting observations that emerge from these figures. 
First, income inequality among the individuals who are elected to Parliament (as 
measured either by the distance between the 75th and the 25th percentile or the ratio of the 
90th to the 10th percentile) has increased steadily over time (see Figure 9). This 
phenomenon is due to the combination of growth in the median and the upper quantiles 
of the income distribution of newly elected legislators (especially in the 90th percentile) 
and the relative stagnation of the lower quantiles of the distribution. Given that the 
earnings distribution of workers in the private-sector has remained fairly stable over time 
(see Figure 11), this suggests that a majority of the newly elected legislators in more 
recent cohorts is drawn from a different segment of the population with respect to their 
income. This phenomenon is particularly evident since the beginning of the Second 
Republic in 1994.  In fact, prior to 1994, between 10% and 25% of the newly elected 
members of Parliament had annual incomes that were less than or equal to the median 
income of individuals employed in the private-sector. After 1994, on the other hand, over 
75% of the newly elected members of Parliament have pre-Parliament incomes that are 
higher than the annual incomes of 90% of the population of private-sector workers. A 
second interesting observation that emerges from Figure 10 is that for all entering cohorts 
for which we have income data, between 75% and 90% of the newly elected legislators 
have a pre-Parliament annual income that is lower than the parliamentary wage. This 
implies that even if they were to stop engaging in any income-earning activity outside 
                                                          
29 For a small sample of 108 individuals who entered the Italian Parliament after 1983, exited, and then 
reentered before 2006, we also observe their income after their first spell in the Parliament. 
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Parliament and simply earn the parliamentary wage after being elected, entering 
Parliament would entail a substantial pecuniary gain for a large majority of legislators. As 
we pointed out before, however, legislators can also earn additional income from extra-
parliamentary activities. 
 
To explore this issue further, Figure 12 summarizes the distribution of income growth 
rates upon entering Parliament, and Figure 13 plots the percentage of new entrants whose 
total real annual income decreases upon entry, for each cohort of new entrants in 
Legislatures IX-XIV.30 As we can see from these figures, entering Parliament is a 
lucrative activity for the vast majority of politicians. The annual real income of over one 
forth of all legislators more than doubles upon entering Parliament, and only about 10% 
of all legislators experience a drop in their real annual income after being elected. 
Overall, the median increase in their real annual income following election to the House 
is 77.8%. The median increase was equal to 32.8% in 1983, increased to 109.2% in 1996, 
and declined to 56.2% in 2001.  
 
Figures 14 and 15 summarize the distribution of the real annual income of legislators in 
excess of their parliamentary wage (in 2005 Euros) for each year between 1981 and 2005 
and for all legislators who are in Parliament the entire year, both in levels (Figure 14) and 
as a percentage of their total annual income (Figure 15). For each year, Figure 16 plots 
the fraction of legislators who report incomes in excess of their parliamentary wage. The 
most striking feature that emerges from Figures 14 and 15 is a clear “regime shift” 
between the First and the Second Republic.31 The distribution of real annual additional 
                                                          
30 Calculation of the growth rate requires observations on the annual income of a politician in the two 
consecutive years before and after entering Parliament. Individuals who do not report any income prior to 
entering Parliament and individuals who were elected in 2006 (for whom we only observe their 2005 
income) are excluded from these calculations.  
31 It is important to point out that this regime shift is not an artifact of the change in the law pertaining to 
the reporting of taxable income by Italian legislators which occurred in 1995. Prior to 1995, legislators had 
to include in their tax return only 82% of their annual parliamentary wage net of the standard deductions 
(contribute previdenziali). After 1995, on the other hand, they have to report their total parliamentary wage, 
either net or gross depending on the tax form they file, which is determined by whether or not they have 
additional income (typically related to self-employment or entrepreneurial activities, attivita’ d’impresa) to 
report. We are extremely grateful to Vincenzo Busa of the Agenzia delle Entrate (the Italian IRS), for 
clarifying these critical aspects of the Italian fiscal law, which we used in order to measure each legislator’s 
annual income in excess of their parliamentary wage from the amounts reported in their tax returns. 
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income reported by legislators is fairly stable and homogeneous until the end of the First 
Republic, both in levels and as a fraction of total income. After 1994, on the other hand, 
there is a sharp increase in the additional income reported by over a quarter of the 
population of legislators. Although the increase is most noticeable in levels, it is also 
evident in the fraction of total annual income coming from sources other than the 
parliamentary wage. At the same time, the fraction of legislators reporting additional 
incomes over and above their parliamentary wage has remained fairly stable over time 
and, if anything, has decreased. The overall result is a dramatic increase in income 
inequality among legislators. 
 
To provide once again a term of comparison, Figure 17 summarizes the distribution of 
the real annual earnings of Italian managers in the private sector between 1985 and 2004 
(in 2005 Euros). When we compare this figure with Figure 14, we see that until 1994, 
almost all legislators earned an additional annual income that was lower than the annual 
earnings of 75% of the managers. Starting with the late 1990s, on the other hand, between 
10 and 25% of the legislators have annual income in addition to their parliamentary wage 
that exceeds the total annual earnings of 50% of the managers. 
 
We began this section of the paper by documenting the dramatic increase in the real 
parliamentary wage of Italian legislators over time. We conclude it by documenting 
another stark phenomenon about the growth in their real total income. Figure 18 plots the 
average real total annual income of elected members of the Italian Parliament between 
1985 and 2004, together with their parliamentary wage and the average real annual 
earnings of Italian managers over the same period of time. Average real annual earning of 
managers in the private sector increased 69.2% between 1985 and 2004 at an average 
annual growth rate of 2.9%. During the same period, the average real total annual income 
of legislators grew 96.7% at an average annual growth rate of 3.8%. In 2004, an Italian 
legislator earned an annual parliamentary wage of 146,533 Euros, plus another 56,335 
Euros on average from additional sources, for a total annual real income that was 1.8 
times larger than the average annual real earnings of an Italian manager (113,087 Euros). 
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3. Outcomes 
In Sections 1 and 2, we documented several aspects related to a number of characteristics 
of Italian legislators (including their income) and how they have evolved over time. In 
this section, we turn our attention to assessing their performance while in office. While 
this is an admittedly difficult task, since it is not al all clear how to measure the 
“productivity” of a politician, our data set contains two variables that can at least shed 
some light on their behavior while in Parliament: their involvement in scandals and their 
attendance of roll-call voting sessions. Unfortunately, neither one of these measures is 
available for the entire time period we cover in our study, although for different reasons. 
To measure the involvement of a politician in a scandal, we use the data collected by 
Golden (2007), which record all the requests put forward by the Italian judiciary to 
remove parliamentary immunity from a legislator in order to prosecute them. These data 
are only available for the period 1948-1994 (that is, only during the First Republic), since 
a constitutional amendment in November of 1993 eliminated the possibility of such 
requests from the judiciary. To measure the extent to which politicians attend legislative 
sessions, we use the official record of participation in electronic voting sessions, which 
were introduced at the beginning of the 8th Legislature.32 Hence, our data set contains 
information on legislators’ attendance of roll-call voting sessions for Legislatures VIII-
XV (that is, during the period 1979-2008).33 
 
Figure 19 plots the percentage of legislators involved in scandals during each of the 11 
Legislatures of Italy’s First Republic. The overall rate is 22.1% and is higher among male 
legislators (22.6%) than female legislators (14.5%). This rate has been fairly stable 
throughout the First Republic except for a sharp increase during the 11th Legislature 
(38.7%) due to the coordinated effort by the Italian judiciary we described in Chapter I 
(“Clean Hands”) which led to the removal of a large number of legislators from office, 
many of whom were then prosecuted and in some cases went to jail. It is also interesting 
                                                          
32 Records are released at the end of each Legislature for the entire duration of the parliamentary term (i.e., 
only the overall attendance rates during a Legislature are available for each elected representative, not their 
annual records). 
33 In a recent paper, in addition to the attendance of voting sessions in Legislatures XIII and XIV, 
Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2008) also analyze data on the number of major bills sponsored 
by each MP in these two Legislatures as another possible measure of the productivity of Italian MPs. 
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to point out that in the early Legislatures (I-IV) most of the requests for indictment of 
MPs were for war crimes or crimes against the Republic. 
 
Figures 20 plots the average legislators’ attendance rates in each of the Legislatures VIII-
XV. In Figure 21, we report the average overall attendance rates during Legislatures 
VIII-XV for each cohort of legislators in office during this period of time (where a cohort 
is defined by the Legislature of first entry). As we can see from these figures, legislators’ 
attendance rates (measured by the fraction of roll-call votes each politician participates in 
during a Legislature), decreased during the First Republic (from an average of 68% in the 
8th Legislature to 60% in the 11th Legislature), and increased during the Second Republic 
(from an average of 62% in the 12th Legislature to 81% in the 15th Legislature). 
Interestingly, attendance rates decrease with seniority (or increase with the cohort of 
entry), with politicians elected relatively more recently participating more than legislators 
from earlier vintages. On average, legislators who first entered the House prior to the 12th 
Legislature (that is, were first elected during the First Republic) have lower attendance 
rates during their entire parliamentary tenure (65%) than legislators who first entered the 
House on or after the 12th Legislature (whose average attendance rate is equal to 73%). 
Mean attendance rates are also higher among female legislators (74%) than male 
legislators (68%).  
 
4. Parties 
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on individual legislators. As we discussed at 
length in Chapter I, however, political parties play a critical role in the selection of 
legislators and their political careers. In this section, we therefore change the unit of 
analysis from the individual to the party, and revisit some of the issues we investigated 
above. In particular, for each of the two periods corresponding to the First and the Second 
Republic, we indentify seven parties (or groups of parties) that account for the vast 
majority of all legislators during that period. The seven parties of the First Republic are: 
Democrazia Cristiana (DC), Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), Partito Comunista 
Italiano (PCI), Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI), Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI), 
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) and Partito Social-Democratico Italiano (PSDI). The 
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seven parties (or groups of parties) of the Second Republic are: Alleanza Nazionale (AN), 
Centro Cristiano Democratico-Cristiani Democratici Uniti-Unione dei Democratici 
Cristiani (CCD), Forza Italia (FI), Lega Nord (LN), Partito Democratico della Sinistra 
(PDS), Rifondazione Comunista (RC) and Ulivo-Margherita-Democratici di Sinistra 
(ULIVO).34  
 
We begin by documenting differences and similarities among parties with respect to the 
demographic characteristics of their legislators. For each party, Figure 22 plots the 
average age at entry of its legislators, and Figure 23 the fraction of female legislators and 
the fraction of legislators with a college degree. Among the parties of the First Republic, 
PCI stands out as the party with the youngest legislators (with a 43.6 average age at 
entry), the largest proportion of female legislators (15%), and the smallest fraction of 
legislators who have a college degree (64.8%). Among the parties of the Second 
Republic, LN has legislators with the smallest average age at entry (41.6 years), PDS and 
RC the largest fractions of female legislators (30.2% and 27.9%, respectively), and RC, 
LN and PDS the smallest fractions of legislators with a college degree (58.3%, 61% and 
62.5%, respectively).  
 
The finding that the PCI, PDS and RC have the largest proportions of female MPSs can 
be explained by the fact that in the first half of the First Republic, about one fourth of the 
PCI members are female, and most left-wing parties of the Second Republic have 
statutory norms meant to ensure equal representation across genders. However, the same 
logic does not apply to the DC, which is the party with the highest proportion of female 
party members among all the parties of the First Republic, but has less than 5% of MPs 
who are women. Given that female candidates were typically included in the party lists, 
we conclude that female DC voters were not voting for female candidates.35 What is also 
apparent is that this gender bias displays a remarkable degree of persistence, since the 
post-DC parties of the Second Republic (CCD) have the smallest fraction of female 
legislators among all the parties of the Second Republic.  
                                                          
34 Note that the labels CCD and ULIVO we use here each contain several parties. 
35 This might be explained by the political role played by the Church parishes (the DC equivalent of the 
PCI cells) in coordinating the behavior of Christian Democrats voters.  
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Turning attention to the sector of occupation and income before entering Parliament of a 
party’s legislators, Table 5 summarizes the distribution of occupations held by 
individuals prior to entering Parliament for each party, Figure 24 depicts the proportions 
of legislators whose last occupation prior to entering Parliament was in the industry 
sector, the legal sector, or the political sector for each party, and Figure 25 plots their 
average real annual income (in 2005 Euros) in the year before entry. The most noticeable 
features that emerge from Figure 24 are the preponderance of lawyers among the MSI 
legislators, of individuals with a background in the industry sector among the FI and LN 
legislators, and of individuals coming from the political sector among the PDS 
legislators. Interestingly, the 1994 election results suggest that most voters did not 
consider the fact that the candidates of FI and LN had little prior political experience as a 
downside. In fact, as a result of the generalized discontent and disaffection towards 
traditional political parties that followed the “Clean Hands” investigation, and partly in 
response to the personalization of politics introduced by the new majoritarian electoral 
system, not having being part of the old political system may have increased the appeal of 
the candidates of FI and LN for a large numbers of voters. 
 
Note that, while the distribution of pre-Parliament occupations of Italian legislators is not 
very different across the parties of the First Republic,36 in the Second Republic there is 
evidence of clustering along the (left-right) ideological dimension. For example, the 
education and political sectors account for nearly half of all the legislators of left-wing 
parties (i.e., PDS, RC, and ULIVO), while the majority of legislators of right-wing 
parties (i.e., CCD, FI, and AN) either had managerial occupations in the industry sector 
or were lawyers before entering the Parliament (with the exception of LN). On the other 
hand, an element of continuity between the First and Second Republic is represented by 
the proportion of teachers and professors among legislators, which has always been 
above 10% across all parties (with the exception of FI). Finally, while the similarities in 
the occupational background between DC and the post-Christian Democratic parties are 
                                                          
36 Besides the aforementioned overrepresentation of lawyers in MSI, the only other exceptions are the 
relatively large fractions of industry workers in PCI and of self-employed in PLI. 
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apparent, it is somewhat surprising that the distribution of pre-Parliament occupations of 
AN legislators resembles more the one of DC legislators than of MSI legislators. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the data that emerges from these figures, is that in spite of 
the fact that the fraction of MPs of LN coming from the business sector is even higher of 
that of the MPs of FI, while the legislators of FI have the highest average real annual 
income before entry among all the parties of the Second Republic (173,189 Euros), the 
legislators of LN rank near the bottom in this dimension (58,243 Euros). This finding can 
be explained by the fact that while LN has been most successful in recruiting relatively 
young people from the working class, including small entrepreneurs, FI has been 
successfully tapping into the pool of upper class managers and executives. Among the 
parties of the First Republic, the legislators of PLI and those of PCI have the highest 
(155,759 Euros) and the lowest (33,886 Euros) average real annual income before entry, 
respectively, which can also be explained by the different professional backgrounds of 
their MPs illustrated in Table 5. 
 
Figure 26 plots the median of the distribution of real income growth rates upon entry 
within each party; Figure 27 the proportion of legislators of each party who experience an 
income loss upon entering Parliament; Figure 28 the average real annual income from 
additional sources while in Parliament (that is, in excess of the parliamentary wage); and 
Figure 29 the fraction of each party’s legislators who report incomes in excess of their 
parliamentary wage. Overall, the patterns that emerge from these figures are very much 
in line with what we observed in the previous graphs, and it is quite evident that being 
elected to Parliament entails large pecuniary gains especially for the legislators of LN, 
PDS and RC. 
 
As we pointed out in Chapter I, grouping parties together based on their ideological 
proximity might be quite misleading since, for example, there seem to be more 
similarities in terms of organization structure and recruitment processes between the DC 
and the PSI than between the latter and the PCI. However, when we look at the average 
annual income before entry in the First Republic, it is interesting to note that this 
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dimension of the data tends to increase as we move from left to right along the 
ideological spectrum (Figure 25).37 The only exception is represented by the MSI, which 
always had a somewhat isolated position with respect to the rest of the party system 
anyway. A similar ranking of parties emerges if we look at the average real annual 
income in excess of the parliamentary wage (Figure 28) or at the fraction of each party’s 
legislators who report incomes in excess of their parliamentary wage (Figure 29). On the 
contrary, there is some evidence of an inverse U-shaped pattern in the average annual 
income before entry in the Second Republic, with the relatively centrists FI, CCD, and 
ULIVO having  the highest values.38 
 
The last issues we analyze with our data pertain to the differences among parties in the 
behavior of their legislators after they are elected to Parliament. For each party, Figure 30 
plots the average rate at which legislators seek reelection at the end of each term and their 
reelection rate (conditional on running), Figure 31 their average attendance rate of roll-
call voting sessions. The PCI and the ULIVO are clear outliers in the First and the 
Second Republic, respectively. Their legislators are relatively less likely to seek 
reelection than legislators of other parties, but at the same time have relatively high 
reelection rates when they do. Also, once elected, their participation rates are the highest. 
Clearly, the discipline imposed by the party that essentially determines who runs for 
office and coordinates the behavior of its elected representatives goes a long way toward 
explaining this apparent anomaly. In addition, it is worth recalling that, as we pointed out 
in Chapter I, the practice of switching candidatures or rotating party members in 
Parliament was quite common in the PCI. Furthermore, in order to foster political 
turnover among its members, RC systematically forced its MPs to leave Parliament and 
                                                          
37 In particular, the average annual income before entry in the First Republic is relatively low for left-wing 
parties such as PCI, PSI, and PSDI, intermediate for center parties such as PRI and DC, and relatively high 
for a right-leaning party like PLI. 
38 Most of the existing political science literature studying Italian political recruitment typically focuses on 
the analysis of the socio-occupational characteristics of MPs in order to detect similarities or differences 
across parties in the recruitment process. Though for the most part useful, sometimes this approach can also 
be misleading. For example, MSI and PSI are both traditional mass parties. Indeed, they are remarkably 
similar in all dimensions, including all income characteristics of their legislators. However, as Figure 24 
shows, almost half of the legislators of MSI are lawyers as compared to relatively more similar proportions 
of industry, legal and political sector occupations in the case of the legislators of PSI.  
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not seek reelection after a second term. Another interesting case is that of the legislators 
of LN, who seek reelection at a relatively low rate, but are also relatively unlikely to get 
reelected when they do. Indeed, FI and LN are the parties with the lowest reelection and 
rerun rates among the parties of the centre-right coalition. This apparent anomaly could 
be the result of the fact that more than half of the LN legislators left the party in the first 
months of 1995 joining the ranks of FI, and in 1996 the LN withdrew its support to the 
second Berlusconi government and ran alone. Furthermore, the large success of these 
parties in the 1994 election was partly the result of a strong national popularity effect, and 
it is possible that some incumbents would have had little chances of winning in a more 
competitive election. Regarding turnover rates in the Second Republic, it is also 
interesting to note that while rerun rates always exceed reelection rates for the parties of 
the center-right coalition (i.e., CCD, FI, LN, and AN), the opposite is true for the parties 
of the center-left coalition (i.e., RC, PDS, and ULIVO). On the other hand, in the First 
Republic a similar pattern can be observed if we consider the partition between 
government parties (i.e., DC, PLI, PRI, PSI, and PSDI) and the main opposition party 
(PCI). 
 
The third aspect of legislators’ behavior we analyze here pertains to their involvement in 
scandals. As we discussed in Section 3 above, our dataset includes the records collected 
by Golden (2007) of all the instances where a formal request to strip a legislator of his or 
her parliamentary immunity to allow prosecution was made by the Italian judiciary 
during the First Republic. Figure 3 plots the average percentage of legislators who were 
the object of such requests during Legislatures V-XI for each of the seven major parties 
of the First Republic.39 In addition, our analysis of the post-parliamentary careers of a 
sample of 860 former legislators revealed that 19 of them who were first elected to the 
Parliament during the first Republic went to jail, 11 of whom belonged to DC, 4 to PSI, 2 
to PSDI, and 1 each to MSI and PRI.40 Although a comparison with the parties of the 
Second Republic is not possible, it is interesting to note that among those of the First 
                                                          
39 As we pointed out before, most of the indictments of MPs in Legislatures I-IV refer to either war crimes 
(for people who fought in WWII), or crimes against the Italian Republic (for people who disputed the 
legitimacy of the new republican form of constitution), as opposed to scandals. 
40 See also Gomez and Travaglio (2006). 
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Republic, some of the parties that fare relatively better with respect to other dimensions 
of the data fare relatively worse with respect to the fraction of their legislators who were 
involved in scandals. For example, there is a strong negative correlation (equal to -0.81), 
between the ranking of the parties of the First Republic based on the attendance rates of 
their legislators, and the ranking based on their scandal rates.  
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Table 1: Distribution of pre-Parliament occupations of Italian legislators by entry cohort 
Sector of employment 
Cohort 
AGR EDU HTH INDW INDM LEG LOB MED MIL POL PUB SE OLF
1948 3.41 19.08 4.26 6.30 6.13 33.90 4.94 8.69 1.87 1.70 2.39 6.81 0.51
1953 4.60 13.39 3.35 6.28 7.11 29.71 10.46 8.79 1.26 3.35 5.86 5.44 0.42
1958 1.32 21.59 3.52 9.25 7.49 20.70 11.45 11.45 0.44 3.08 4.41 4.85 0.44
1963 3.03 19.91 6.49 10.82 5.19 20.78 10.82 9.52 0.87 3.03 3.03 6.49 0.00
1968 2.59 18.10 4.74 11.21 6.90 21.98 7.33 7.33 0.43 4.74 7.33 7.33 0.00
1972 0.00 12.92 4.78 14.83 8.13 21.53 6.70 11.48 0.96 4.31 7.18 7.18 0.00
1976 1.50 24.44 4.51 15.41 7.52 13.53 3.76 9.02 1.13 8.27 4.14 6.02 0.75
1979 1.60 20.32 4.28 14.97 9.09 14.44 3.21 11.76 0.00 6.95 5.88 7.49 0.00
1983 1.51 19.25 6.04 11.32 6.42 12.83 4.91 10.57 0.38 9.43 8.30 9.06 0.00
1987 0.43 28.57 5.63 6.06 5.63 12.12 2.60 11.69 0.87 10.39 8.66 5.63 1.73
1992 0.70 19.72 5.28 7.39 14.08 11.62 3.87 8.45 0.35 8.10 9.51 10.56 0.35
1994 2.41 21.05 8.55 4.82 18.64 15.35 1.75 7.46 0.22 4.82 7.02 7.02 0.88
1996 0.32 20.45 7.47 6.17 18.51 17.21 1.95 5.19 0.97 5.84 4.22 8.77 2.92
2001 0.34 15.36 8.53 5.46 20.82 15.02 0.68 7.51 0.68 7.85 5.80 9.22 2.73
2006 0.33 16.56 6.62 4.97 18.21 10.60 2.98 8.94 0.00 15.23 5.96 8.28 1.32
Sample 
All 1.74 19.41 5.74 8.36 11.12 18.95 4.79 8.92 0.76 6.21 5.74 7.39 0.86
Men 1.85 17.49 5.90 8.03 11.62 20.42 5.03 8.8 0.85 5.69 5.87 7.69 0.77
Women 0.72 37.32 4.31 11.48 6.46 5.26 2.63 10.05 0.00 11.00 4.55 4.55 1.67
1st Rep 2.06 19.74 4.77 9.77 7.51 20.93 6.15 9.67 0.91 5.38 5.68 7.03 0.41
2nd Rep 1.03 18.69 7.87 5.30 18.98 14.64 1.84 7.28 0.44 8.02 5.89 8.17 1.84
Note: AGR = agriculture, EDU = education, HTH = health care, INDW = industry workers, INDM = industry 
managers, LEG = legal, LOB = lobbying, MED = media, MIL = military, POL = political, PUB = public, SE = self-
employment, OLF = out of the labor force. 
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Table 2: Distribution of occupations of U.S. legislators by entry cohort 
Sector of employment 
Cohort 
Business Education Legal Other 
1947 17.95   6.41 62.82 12.82 
1949 20.20   7.07 51.52 21.21 
1951 19.05   4.76 53.97 22.22 
1953 20.24   3.57 51.19 25.00 
1955 13.21   9.43 54.72 22.64 
1957 12.24   4.08 55.10 28.57 
1959 21.35   4.49 48.31 25.84 
1961 20.90   5.97 52.24 20.90 
1963 17.33   2.67 53.33 26.67 
1965 19.78   7.69 46.15 26.37 
1967 14.06   7.81 42.19 35.94 
1969 12.24 12.24 44.90 30.61 
1971 18.52 12.96 42.59 25.93 
1973 19.74 11.84 42.11 26.32 
1975 24.44 13.33 41.11 21.11 
1977 27.94   7.35 44.12 20.59 
1979 25.00 12.50 31.25 31.25 
1981 33.78   8.11 36.49 21.62 
1983   5.95   1.19 16.67 76.19 
1985 14.29   9.52 30.95 45.24 
1987   7.41   7.41 33.33 51.85 
1989 19.05 19.05 30.95 30.95 
1991 22.22 11.11 28.89 37.78 
1993 16.67 14.04 39.47 29.82 
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Table 3: Distribution of occupations of a sample of former Italian legislators at exit 
Sector of employment 
Sample 
AGR EDU HTH INDW INDM LEG LOB MED MIL POL PUB SE 
All 1.01 11.53 3.04 0.89 11.28 8.49 2.03 8.11 0.25 44.23 5.83 3.30
Men 1.00 11.25 3.28 1.00 11.25 9.54 1.85 8.26 0.28 43.16 5.84 3.28
Women 1.15 13.79 1.15 0.00 11.49 0.00 3.45 6.90 0.00 52.87 5.75 3.45
Note: AGR = agriculture, EDU = education, HTH = health care, INDW = industry workers, INDM = industry 
managers, LEG = legal, LOB = lobbying, MED = media, MIL = military, POL = political, PUB = public, SE = 
self-employment.
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Table 4: Pre- to post-Parliament occupation transition matrix of Italian legislators 
  Post 
Pre 
EDU HTH INDW INDM LEG LOB MED POL PUB SE 
EDU 43.26 0.00 0.00 5.08 0.56 1.69 5.06 34.27 8.47 1.13
HTH 7.55 43.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.89 45.28 0.00 1.89
INDW 2.13 0.00 4.26 17.02 0.00 10.64 2.13 61.70 0.00 2.13
INDM 0.00 0.00 1.25 46.25 0.00 2.50 2.50 37.50 2.50 5.00
LEG 5.26 0.00 0.00 7.02 53.51 0.00 0.88 28.07 4.39 0.88
LOB 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 20.83 0.00 62.50 4.17 0.00
MED 2.25 0.00 0.00 5.62 0.00 0.00 46.07 43.82 1.12 1.12
POL 0.00 0.00 3.23 6.45 0.00 0.00 8.06 74.19 4.84 3.23
PUB 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.84 1.96 0.00 3.92 54.9 27.45 3.92
SE 1.89 0.00 1.89 13.21 3.77 0.00 1.89 49.06 5.66 22.64
Note: EDU = education, HTH = health care, INDW = industry workers, INDM = industry 
managers, LEG = legal, LOB = lobbying, MED = media, POL = political, PUB = public, SE = 
self-employment, OLF = out of the labor force. 
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Table 5: Distribution of pre-Parliament occupations of Italian legislators by party 
                                                         Sector of employment Party AGR EDU HTH INDW INDM LEG LOB MED MIL POL PUB SE OLF
First Republic 
DC 3.36 22.91 5.08 4.12 10.35 26.27 4.70 4.79 0.48 1.05 9.40 7.00 0.48
MSI 0.77 10.00 4.62 2.31 4.62 44.62 3.85 17.69 3.08 2.31 0.77 5.38 0.00
PCI 1.51 19.61 3.48 22.97 1.62 9.05 10.09 11.02 0.46 11.48 2.32 6.03 0.35
PLI 1.22 12.20 2.44 15.85 12.20 7.32 0.00 8.54 0.00 0.00 2.44 32.93 4.88
PRI 1.43 21.43 11.43 1.43 12.86 22.86 0.00 11.43 1.43 1.43 4.29 10.00 0.00
PSDI 0.00 11.27 9.86 0.00 7.04 22.54 8.45 11.27 2.82 0.00 12.68 14.08 0.00
PSI 0.88 18.71 2.05 7.02 6.43 25.73 7.02 11.70 1.46 5.85 5.85 6.73 0.58
Second Republic 
AN 1.12 15.17 8.99 5.62 18.54 21.91 0.00 11.80 1.69 1.12 6.18 7.87 0.00
CCD 0.00 18.92 9.46 4.05 17.57 22.97 0.00 2.70 0.00 4.05 8.11 10.81 1.35
FI 2.26 9.68 10.65 1.94 30.97 19.03 0.32 8.06 0.65 3.23 2.90 8.71 1.61
LN 2.07 11.40 8.29 7.77 29.53 8.81 1.04 3.63 0.00 1.55 3.63 21.24 1.04
PDS 1.04 23.96 2.08 11.46 9.38 7.29 7.29 3.13 0.00 27.08 6.25 1.04 0.00
RC 0.00 28.57 4.76 13.10 2.38 3.57 1.19 14.29 0.00 15.48 8.33 4.76 3.57
ULIVO 0.00 23.96 6.21 6.51 13.61 10.36 3.85 6.21 0.30 13.02 7.40 5.92 2.66
Note: AGR = agriculture, EDU = education, HTH = health care, INDW = industry workers, INDM = industry 
managers, LEG = legal, LOB = lobbying, MED = media, MIL = military, POL = political, PUB = public, SE = self-
employment, OLF = out of the labor force. 
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Figure 1: Turnover in the Italian Parliament
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Figure 2: Turnover in the U.S. Congress
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
51
19
53
19
55
19
57
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
reelection rate
turnover rate
rerun rate
 
 62
Figure 3: Characteristics of Italian legislators by entry cohort
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Figure 4: Characteristics of U.S. legislators by entry cohort
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Figure 5: Real annual parliamentary wage in Italy (2005 Euros)
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Figure 6: Real annual congressional wage in the U.S. (2005 USD)
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Figure 7: Difference in real annual wage of Italian and U.S. legislators 
(2005 Euros)
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Figure 8: Average annual real earnings, 1985-2004 (2005 Euros)
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Figure 9: Income distribution before entry (2005 Euros)
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Figure 10: Income distribution before entry as a fraction of the 
parliamentary wage
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Figure 11: Income distribution of private-sector workers
(2005 Euros)
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Figure 12: Distribution of real income growth rates on entry
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
 
 67
Figure 13: Percentage of legislators with real income losses on entry
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Figure 14: Distribution of additional income (2005 Euros)
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Figure 15: Distribution of additional income as a fraction of total 
(2005 Euros)
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Figure 16: Percentage of legislators reporting additional income
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Figure 17: Income distribution of managers (2005 Euros)
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Figure 18: Average annual real income, 1985-2004 (2005 Euros)
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Figure 19: Scandal rates in the Italian Parliament by legislature
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Figure 20: Attendace rates in the Italian Parliament by legislature
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Figure 21: Attendace rates in the Italian Parliament by cohort
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Figure 22: Average age at entry
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Figure 23: Percentage female and percentage with a college degree
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Figure 24: Distribution of occupations
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
DC MSI PCI PLI PRI PSDI PSI AN CCD FI LN PDS RC ULIVO
% industry
% legal
% political
 
First Republic Second Republic 
First Republic Second Republic 
 73
Figure 25: Average real annual income before entry
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Figure 27: Percentage of legislators with real income losses on entry
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Figure 28: Average real annual additional income after entry
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Figure 29: Percentage of legislators reporting additional income
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Figure 31: Attendance rates
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CHAPTER III: Analysis and conclusions  
 
In this chapter, we use our data to tackle several questions that pertain to the selection of 
Italian politicians, their labor market, and their overall quality. In order to accomplish this 
goal we restrict attention to the post-1981 sample for which we observe their annual 
income and their attendance rates of parliamentary voting sessions. We then draw some 
general conclusions that contribute to the debate about the relative efficacy and 
desirability of alternative policies regarding the selection and the compensation of elected 
representatives.  
 
1. The private returns to legislative experience and the quality of politicians 
The first question we pose is whether the earnings of politicians prior to entering 
Parliament can reveal some useful information about the type of individuals who are 
elected to represent the Italian citizens (since members of the executive are typically 
selected from among the legislators, this analysis extends beyond Parliament and is also 
relevant for the government). To address this question we specify and estimate a simple 
equation where the log of annual real income (expressed in 2005 Euros) in the year 
before entering the Parliament is regressed on: a vector of demographic characteristics 
(i.e., age, age square, education level and gender); a set of year dummies corresponding 
to the start of each Legislature since 1981, LexVIII-LexXV, capturing possible trends and 
other year effects; a set of dummy variables corresponding to the twelve categories that 
we used in the previous chapter to classify the pre-Parliament occupations of legislators 
(we denote them by AGR = agriculture, EDU = education, HTH = health care, INDW = 
industry workers, INDM = industry managers, LEG = legal, LOB = lobbying, MED = 
media, MIL = military, POL = political, PUB = public, SE = self-employment); and a set 
of dummy variables denoting the party affiliation upon entering Parliament which were 
also introduced in Chapter I (these are AN, CCD, DC, FI. LN, MSI, PCI, PDS, PLI, PSI, 
PSDI, PSI, RC, ULIVO, plus a residual category OTHER for all other minor parties).41 
The omitted dummies in the regression are LexVIII, PUB and OTHER, so that the 
                                                          
41 Recall that according to our classification CCD includes Centro Cristiano Democratico, Cristiani 
Democratici Uniti and Unione dei Democratici Cristiani and ULIVO includes l’Ulivo, La Margherita and 
Democratici di Sinistra. 
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benchmark group is the legislators affiliated with a minor party who entered the 
Parliament during the 8th Legislature coming from employment in the public sector. Due 
to the possible presence of outliers, we performed a robust regression (Huber) as well as a 
quantile (median) regression. The results are reported in Table 1.  
 
Before interpreting our findings, note that the results are remarkably stable across the two 
estimations performed, and appear to be quite robust.42 The first set of findings refers to 
the (cross-section) relationship between the demographic characteristics of the sample of 
individuals who are elected to the Italian Parliament and their real annual earnings in the 
year before they are first elected.  Note that, holding everything else constant, the pre-
Parliament income of female legislators is between 20.5% and 21.8% lower (depending 
on whether we look at the robust or the median regression) than that of male legislators, 
and a college degree increases the pre-Parliament income of legislators by between 
30.8% and 32.2%. Also, the average (and median) pre-Parliament earnings of the 
legislators coming from the public sector are comparable to those of the legislators 
coming from the legal and the media sector as well as from managerial occupations in the 
industry sector, and are significantly higher than those of legislators coming from other 
sectors. Most importantly, even after controlling for demographic characteristics, sector 
of employment and differences across time period, many of the coefficients associated 
with party dummies are statistically different from zero. They are positive for (in order of 
the size of the estimated coefficient) PLI, PRI, DC, FI and PSI, and negative for LN and 
RC; for all other parties the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. This 
finding clearly indicates the presence of unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the 
(income-earning) ability of legislators, and may be interpreted as a measure of the 
relative success of different parties to recruit higher-quality politicians. On the other 
hand, another possible (although more cynical) interpretation is that being affiliated with 
specific parties generates different employment opportunities, and the simple cross-
section regressions we performed cannot determine which interpretation (if either) is 
correct. We return to these issues in more detail below. 
                                                          
42 In addition to the results reported here, we performed a number of robustness checks using a variety of 
specifications and alternative estimation techniques (including simple OLS), all of which produced point 
estimates which are within the confidence intervals of the estimated parameters in Table 1. 
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The second issue we consider here is to measure the private returns to an individual from 
a career in politics. In particular, using our data we can quantify the returns to experience 
in the Italian Parliament, or in other words the extent to which each year spent in 
Parliament increases a legislator’s income from sources outside of the Parliament.  To 
achieve this goal, we specify and estimate a panel regression model where the log of the 
annual real income of legislators (in 2005 Euros) from all sources other than the 
parliamentary wage (henceforth, extra income) is regressed on: the legislators’ age and 
age square; their parliamentary experience (measured by their number of years in 
Parliament) and experience square; the fraction of the year they are in Parliament (which 
is equal to zero the year before they are elected for the first time, a number between zero 
and one the year they are first elected and their last year in Parliament, since the 
beginning of a new Legislature never coincides with the beginning of a calendar year, 
and one otherwise); and a set of time (year, Legislature, and cohort specific) dummy 
variables which capture possible trends in real income and all other effects systematically 
related to events occurring over time (like, for example, changes in the real parliamentary 
wage). In addition, the error term in the panel regression contains two components: an 
idiosyncratic term capturing random (iid) shocks, and an individual specific component 
or fixed effect. The role of the fixed effects is to control for all (observed and 
unobserved) characteristics of each individual legislator. In addition, to the extent that 
earning (and reporting) extra income is the consequence of a choice each individual 
makes, the fixed effects also control for the “selection effects” such choices may 
introduce in the data. The results are reported in Table 2. 
 
As we can see from Table 2, holding everything else constant, the amount of extra annual 
income a legislator earns decreases with the fraction of the year the legislator is in 
Parliament, but does not vary with his or her age. Most importantly, it significantly 
increases with experience. Using our estimates, we calculate that the first year in 
Parliament increases the extra wage of a legislator by 4.2%. The marginal effect of an 
additional year in Parliament then declines slowly with the number of year in Parliament 
and reaches zero after 12 years of experience. Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) 
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performed a similar exercise for the U.S. and estimated the returns to congressional 
experience in post-congressional wages. They estimated an annual rate of return in all 
post-congressional occupations of 2.6% for the first year in Congress, and found that the 
marginal effect of an additional year in Congress decreases quite rapidly with experience. 
Figure 1 plots the estimated marginal returns as a function of the number of years of 
legislative experience for both countries. It is interesting to note that in addition of being 
higher, the returns to legislative experience in Italy are earned by a politician during his 
or her parliamentary tenure, while U.S. legislators can only realize such returns after they 
leave Congress.  
 
In our data set, there is a small sample of 108 individuals who enter the Parliament for the 
first time after 1981, exit Parliament and then reenter prior to 2006. This implies that for 
these individuals we observe their annual income while they are not in Parliament both 
before and after their first spell of Parliamentary tenure. While this sample is hardly 
representative of the entire population of Italian legislators, we can nevertheless use these 
observations to supplement our previous analysis and gain some insights about the 
overall returns to parliamentary experience. A simple calculation based on the difference 
between the two annual incomes (both expressed in 2005 Euros) for each of the 
individuals in this sample, yields an average (median) return per year of experience in 
Parliament of 4,276 Euros (3,251 Euros) corresponding  to a 23.1% (10.2%) increase 
over their annual income before their first entry. 
 
We are now in a position to revisit the issue related to the quality of politicians and 
potential differences across parties in their ability to recruit legislators of different 
quality. Furthermore, we also want to assess the extent to which the quality of politicians 
has changed over time, especially between the First and the Second Republic. An 
important aspect of the quality of politicians is their skill endowment, which includes 
both observable characteristics (e.g., education), as well as characteristics which are 
intrinsically hard to measure directly (e.g., general ability). In addition to the estimates 
reported in Table 2, the panel regression we performed to estimate the returns to political 
experience in Parliament also generated estimates of the individual fixed effects, one for 
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each of the 2,760 legislators in our sample for whom we have data on their annual 
income. Recall that an individual’s fixed effect summarizes all of his or her 
characteristics that are fixed over time and that are relevant for his or her income-earning 
ability. In other words, it represents a summary of an individual’s overall endowments 
(both observable and unobservable). To the extent that the individuals’ skills in the labor 
market are positively correlated with their ability as politicians (see, e.g., Mattozzi and 
Merlo, 2008), decomposing the fixed effects into their two components (that is, the part 
that can be explained by measurable characteristics and the residual), can shed some light 
on the overall skill endowments of Italian politicians.  
 
To accomplish this goal, we regress these fixed effects on individual-specific observable 
characteristics (namely, education, gender, and sector of employment prior to election to 
Parliament), and then summarize the distribution of the residuals we obtain from this 
regression (which represents a summary measure of the individuals’ unobserved 
“ability”), for each party as well as for each group of legislators who were first elected to 
the House during the First Republic (Legislatures VIII-XI), and the Second Republic 
(Legislatures XII-XV).43 The results are reported in Table 3.44 Note that a value of zero 
denotes politicians who are “average,” while positive (negative) values denote politicians 
who are above (below) average.  Figure 2 plots the percentage of elected legislators of 
each party whose “ability score” is positive. 
 
As we can see from Table 3, the median ability score of their elected representatives is 
positive for all the major parties of the First Republic, while it is negative for all the 
major parties of the Second Republic. The same is true with respect to the mean ability 
                                                          
43 Recall that although the First Republic also included Legislatures I-VII, we can only perform this 
analysis for Legislatures VIII-XV because of the lack of pre-1981 income data. 
44 Since, as we mentioned above, the fixed effects may also capture (labor supply) selection effects related 
to the fact that a fraction of the legislators does not report positive extra income while they are in 
Parliament, to assess the robustness of our findings we also performed a Heckman two-step estimation 
procedure. The procedure consists of a first step where we estimate a Probit model of the probability of 
reporting positive extra income as a function of all of the individual variables, including party affiliation 
and cohort of first entry into the Parliament, and the parliamentary wage, and a second step where we 
regress the fixed effects on the individual-specific characteristics and an extra term (the inverse of the Mills 
ratio from the first step) that captures possible selection effects. The results we obtained from this 
alternative procedure are very similar. 
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score, except that FI has a positive score, although very close to zero. Within each set of 
parties, their relative ranking based on their median (mean) ability scores is PLI, PRI, 
PSDI, DC, MSI, PSI, and PCI (PLI, PRI, PSDI, DC, PSI, MSI and PCI) among the 
parties of the First Republic;45 among the parties of the Second Republic, their relative 
ranking based on their median (mean) scores is FI, PDS, ULIVO, AN, CCD, RC and LN 
(FI, PDS, RC, ULIVO, CCD, AN and LN). With respect to how homogenous the quality 
composition of the group of legislators of each party is, measured by the interquartile 
range (i.e., the distance between the 25th and the 75th percentile), the most homogenous 
(heterogeneous) parties of the First and Second Republic are DC and LN (PLI and FI), 
respectively. Looking at Figure 2, we observe that the party with the largest fraction of 
“above average” legislators in the First Republic is the PLI (with 87%), followed by 
PSDI (80%), PRI (76.8%), DC (73.5%), PSI (60%), MSI (59.7%), and PCI (58%).46 
Among the parties of the Second Republic, the party with the largest fraction of “above 
average” legislators is FI (with 48%), followed by ULIVO and CCD (36%), RC (34.2%), 
AN (33%), PDS (31.6%), and a distant last LN (with only 18.6%). Overall, we observe 
that the switch from the First to the Second Republic lead to a dramatic worsening of the 
quality of the cohorts of politicians who have entered Parliament after 1994. In fact, the 
fractions of “above average” new legislators who were elected to the Parliament during 
the First and the Second Republic are equal to 61.9% and 35.2%, respectively.47 This 
decline goes hand in hand with the dramatic decrease in the average level of education of 
                                                          
45 In interpreting these findings, it is worth recalling that, as noted in Chapter I, the best Communist 
politicians were more likely to be members of the Central Committee rather than MPs, while holding a seat 
in Parliament was common practice within the DC leadership.  
46 These results confirm once more the potential perils of basing an analysis of the political parties’ 
recruitment function solely on the socio-occupational characteristics of their MPs. For example, Figure 2 
shows that MSI and PSI were equally able to select “above average” legislators, despite the fact that MSI 
was selecting politicians mainly from the legal sector and PSI from the industry and political sectors as well 
(see Figure 24, Chapter II). A similar argument applies to the three elite parties of the First Republic, i.e., 
PLI, PRI and PSDI. 
47 It is useful to point out that there are no noticeable differences in the distributions of ability scores across 
the four different cohorts that first entered the Parliament in 1994, 1996, 2001 and 2006, respectively, 
except for a slight improvement in the relative ability of the cohort elected in Legislature XV. For example, 
the fractions of “above average” new legislators who were elected to the Parliament in Legislatures XII-
XV are 33.7%, 35.8%, 34.2% and 40%, respectively.   
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the newly elected MPs, which as we pointed out before, has been a staple of the Second 
Republic (see Figure 3, Chapter II). 48   
 
It is interesting to relate our findings on the deterioration of the quality of elected 
legislators (both with respect to their “ability score” as well as their level of education) in 
the period 1994-2006 relative to the earlier period (1981-1994), with what happened to 
the parliamentary wage. As we described in Chapter II, during the period 1981-2006 the 
(real) parliamentary wage displays a monotonically increasing pattern (see Figure 5, 
Chapter II). Furthermore, while in the late 1980s and early 1990s it was comparable to 
the (real) congressional wage of U.S. legislators, since 1994 it has become larger (see 
Figure 7, Chapter II). Thus, there appears to be a negative correlation between the quality 
of elected legislators and the parliamentary wage.     
 
Recently, political economists have begun to investigate the relation between relative 
salaries in the political and private sectors and the behavior of politicians. For example, 
Besley (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004) model the 
relationship between relative wages of elected officials and their average ability, in 
environments where ability is uni-dimensional (i.e., common to the political and private 
spheres). Individuals decide whether to run for office based on their ability. In Caselli and 
Morelli (2004), individuals with relatively low ability have a lower opportunity cost of 
running, as they face worse opportunities in the private sector. This constrains the options 
available to voters, and may generate equilibria where only low-ability politicians are 
elected.49 In their framework, increasing the relative wage of elected officials increases 
the average ability of politicians.50 Similarly, in the model of Messner and Polborn (2004), 
lower ability individuals are more likely to run for office in equilibrium. The equilibrium 
mechanism is different, however. It relies on the fact that if salaries of elected officials are 
                                                          
48 Note that if we rank all parties of the First and Second Republic based on the percentage of their 
legislators with a college degree and on the median quality score of their legislators separately, the 
correlation between the two rankings is 0.83. 
49 In their model, the prestige from holding office depends on the quality of the political class. If 
incompetent individuals are elected, politics becomes a low-status occupation, which further deters high-
ability individuals from entering. 
50 Besley (2004) obtains a similar result in the context of a political agency model with moral hazard and 
adverse selection, and also provides some empirical evidence. 
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relatively low, high-ability individuals may free-ride by not running and letting low-
ability types run instead. This implies a U-shaped relation between the salary of elected 
officials and their average ability.51 
 
Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), on the other hand, propose a dynamic equilibrium model of 
the careers of politicians. In their model there are two dimensions of ability, political skills 
and market ability. Individual endowments of each type of skill, which are private 
information, are positively correlated. In equilibrium, there are both career politicians 
(who work in the political sector until retirement) and individuals with political careers 
(who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector). Career politicians 
enter the political sector because of the non-pecuniary rewards from being in office, which 
include both ego rents and potential benefits from influencing policy. Individuals with 
political careers, on the other hand, enter the political sector in order to increase their 
market wages.52 In equilibrium, individuals with political careers (i.e., those who 
eventually plan to voluntarily leave politics to reap rewards in the private sector) have 
relatively better political skills than career politicians, although career politicians are still 
better than average. 
 
Mattozzi and Merlo find that an increase in the salary a politician receives while in office 
decreases the average quality of individuals who become politicians, decreases turnover in 
office (as the proportion of career politicians goes up), and has an ambiguous effect on the 
average quality of career politicians. These results derive from the fact that a higher salary 
in the political sector makes politics a relatively more attractive option for all levels of 
political skills, thus lowering the quality of the marginal politician (entry effect). At the 
same time, however, relatively better incumbent politicians are willing to remain in 
politics, since the salary in politics is now better relative to the market wages (retention 
effect). 
                                                          
51 While the probability that low-ability individuals run for office increases monotonically with the salary, 
for high-ability individuals it may decrease at relatively low levels of salary before it increases.  
52 Since political skills are positively correlated with market ability, and politics is a showcase (i.e., 
individuals who serve in office display their political skills), incumbent politicians may leave the political 
sector and work in the market sector at a higher wage than they would have anticipated receiving had they 
not become politicians. 
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From an empirical point of view, Keane and Merlo (2007) analyze how the career 
decisions of U.S. legislators respond to monetary incentives. Their findings confirm the 
existence of the retention effect highlighted by Mattozzi and Merlo and show that it may 
be fairly sizeable. For example, they find that a 20% reduction in the congressional wage 
would lead to a 14% decrease in the average duration of congressional careers. Notably, 
however, the effect is not uniform across politicians of different types. In their analysis, 
Keane and Merlo distinguish between two latent characteristics of politicians: their 
political skills which refer to the ability to win elections (“skill type”), and their political 
ambition or desire for legislative accomplishment (“achiever type”). Their analysis shows 
that a reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce skilled 
politicians to exit Congress, but not politicians who are the achiever type. They argue that 
whether a politician is the “achiever” type is perhaps a better measure of his/her “quality” 
than whether he/she is the “skilled” type (which refers to a politician’s electability). Thus, 
they conclude that the congressional wage does not differentially impact the career 
decisions of high vs. low quality members of Congress, although it does affect skilled 
politicians relatively more. 
 
Borrowing some insights from this literature, we conclude that the sharp increase in the 
parliamentary wage in Italy has contributed to the decline of the quality of the elected 
legislators over time (via the entry effect pointed out by Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008). 
However, a drastic reduction in the parliamentary wage at this time may be 
counterproductive (because of the retention effect discussed above).53 On the other hand, 
the historic circumstances that allowed elected Italian legislators to maintain additional 
sources of income form activities outside of Parliament no longer apply. To date, the 
parliamentary wage of Italian legislators is more than 4 times larger than the average 
                                                          
53 Note, however, that the possible drawbacks of the retention effect would depend on the differential 
impact a reduction in the parliamentary wage would have on the behavior of politicians of different types. 
If it could be shown, as pointed out by Keane and Merlo (2007) for the case of the U.S., that a reduction in 
the parliamentary wage would not disproportionately induce relatively better legislators to leave the Italian 
parliament, then reducing the parliamentary wage may be a desirable policy. Also, note that following a 
10% reduction in the parliamentary wage in 2006, it appears that the new cohort elected to the Italian 
parliament that year was of slightly better quality than the previous cohorts based on their ability score 
although not with respect to their average level of education. However, the electoral system was also 
different, thus making the interpretation of the comparison difficult.    
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annual earnings of an Italian manager working in the private sector (see Figure 8, Chapter 
II), and their additional annual income is on average equal to another 38% of their 
parliamentary wage. We therefore believe that a sensible policy would be to preclude 
Italian legislators from supplementing their parliamentary wage with additional earnings 
from sources outside of Parliament (as it is the case in the U.S.), and to index the 
parliamentary wage to the growth rate of the Italian economy. 
 
Barring any discussion of the potential conflict of interest which arises when elected 
representatives can engage in income-earning activities outside of their public office, 
there is another important reason why limiting these activities may be desirable: de facto 
“part-time” legislators may not be as effective and/or as invested into the job of 
representing citizens as “full-time” ones. Using our data we can quantify the extent to 
which a legislator’s involvement in income-earning activities outside of the Parliament 
affects his or her participation in parliamentary activities, or more precisely the extent to 
which earning additional income in excess of the parliamentary wage reduces a 
legislator’s attendance rate of parliamentary voting sessions. To achieve this goal, we 
specify and estimate a panel regression model similar to the one we used to estimate the 
private returns to parliamentary experience, except that we now regress the attendance 
rate of legislators in each parliamentary term on their age and age square, their 
parliamentary experience and experience square, their average real annual extra income 
during the Legislature (in thousands of 2005 Euros), and a set of Legislature specific 
(time) dummy variables. As before, the role of the time dummies is to control for 
possible trends and all other effects systematically related to events occurring over time 
(like, for example, changes in the parliamentary majority that would make it more or less 
important for a legislator to attend the voting sessions during a Legislature), and the role 
of the fixed effects in the error term is to control for all (observed and unobserved) 
legislators’ characteristics that are related to their attendance behavior. An important 
difference with the previous panel regression, however, is that the amount of extra 
income earned and the attendance of parliamentary sessions are simultaneously 
determined. In fact, both variables are presumably jointly endogenously determined as 
outcomes of each legislator’s choice of how to allocate his or her time between 
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parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities. To address the endogeneity issue, we 
adopt an instrumental variable procedure where the annual income before entering 
Parliament is used as an instrument for the extra income earned while in Parliament.  The 
results are reported in Table 4.54 As we can see from the estimates, holding everything 
else constant, an additional 10,000 Euros of extra income earned outside of Parliament 
decreases the attendance rate of a legislator by 1%.55 This result strengthens the case for 
precluding Italian legislators from supplementing their parliamentary wage with 
additional earnings from sources outside of Parliament 
 
The analysis of legislators’ attendance rates of parliamentary voting sessions also allows 
us to bring a new element into our discussion of the quality of the Italian legislators and 
how it has changed between the First and the Second Republic. As we mentioned above, 
Keane and Merlo (2007) raise the issue of whether, using their terminology, being a 
“skilled” type is a better measure of the overall quality of a politician than being an 
“achiever” type. More broadly, in addition to possessing the type of general skills that 
make an individual more likely to be successful in every occupation (e.g., intelligence), 
the list of desirable traits for a politician typically include being “public spirited” (e.g., 
having a desire for public service and/or influencing public policy), as well as personal 
characteristics such as morality, integrity and work ethic. Clearly, being involved in a 
scandal and/or being convicted of corruption or another crime is a direct indication of a 
lack of such desirable characteristics. On the other hand, although one could certainly not 
use attendance rates as a direct measure of public spiritedness, they may be positively 
correlated with such characteristics.56 The data we presented in Chapter II provide some 
information in this regard and show, for example, that attendance rates have increased in 
                                                          
54 Another important difference with the other panel regression we described above is that unlike income, 
which is observed on an annual basis, attendance rates are only available for the entire duration of each 
Legislature. Hence, the panel of attendance rates is much shorter (i.e., the number of observations for each 
individual is much smaller), which affects the performance of the fixed-effect estimator. We therefore use a 
random-effect estimator, which we then use to predict the individual fixed effects. 
55 Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2008) obtain a similar finding in their analysis of the behavior 
of Italian MPs in Legislatures XIII and XIV. We also find that, coeteris paribus, attendance rates decline 
with experience in Parliament, but increase with age.  
56 Attendance rates obviously depend on party discipline. Furthermore, they are measured with error 
because of the pervasive phenomenon of the “pianisti” (i.e., legislators who record roll-call votes  not only 
for themselves but also for several other colleagues of their own party).  
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the Second Republic relative to the First. An important limitation of our data set, 
however, is that it does not contain any variable that would allow us to address this issue 
in a satisfactory manner, and provide a way for assessing the “quality” of politicians and 
whether it has changed over time. In this regard, a data collection effort similar to the one 
undertaken by Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) for the United States, who compiled a 
record of major legislative achievements by members of Congress, may go a long way 
toward casting some light on these important questions. 
 
2. Some closing remarks on the Italian electoral law 
As we already pointed out in Chapter I, Italy has experienced two changes of its electoral 
law in the last twelve years. Until 1994 (Legislatures I-XI), elections were held according 
to an open-list proportional system. In 1994, a mixed-majoritarian system was introduced 
(the so-called Mattarellum), which was used to elect Legislatures XII-XIV. Finally, in 
2005, a new closed-list proportional system was adopted (the so-called Porcellum), and 
has been used to elect Legislatures XV and XVI (the newest Legislature which was 
elected in April 2008).  
 
Most of the public and scholarly debate on the relative merits of the different electoral 
laws focuses on their impact on the number of political parties and on government 
stability. With the adoption of the mixed-majoritarian electoral system, the average 
duration of the executive increased from slightly above one year in the First Republic to 
more than two years in Legislatures XII-XIV.57 On the other hand, it has not been 
effective in reducing party fragmentation. In fact, while in 1994 – the first election with 
the mixed-majoritarian electoral system – the number of parties in the Lower House 
decreased from 16 to 10, in the next election in 1996 it went back to 14, and then down to 
8 in 2001 (see Figure 1, Chapter I). Under the closed-list proportional system, 16 parties 
were represented in the 15th Legislature and 5 in the current Parliament. 
 
                                                          
57 Government duration is measured as the time elapsed between two changes in the partisan composition 
of the cabinet. As a term of comparison, during the period 1945-96, government duration was over three 
and a half years in Germany, almost five years in Sweden and eight and a half years in the UK. 
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However, a second issue which is equally important in the assessment of the relative 
desirability of different electoral systems is whether these systems differ in any 
systematic way with respect to the incentives they provide to politicians in terms of 
electoral accountability. In a pure majoritarian system, an incumbent typically re-runs for 
office in the same district where he or she was first elected. Hence, at least to some 
degree, voters can evaluate the incumbent according to his or her own performance in 
office. In proportional systems, on the other hand, several incumbents run for office in 
the same district. Moreover, in a closed-list proportional system, such as the Porcellum, 
electors can only vote for the party list, but cannot choose a particular candidate on the 
list. As a result, the link between an incumbent’s own political performance and the 
probability of being reelected is weakened, and so is the electoral accountability. 
Although in an open-list proportional system — where voters vote for the party and for 
one (or more) candidate(s) in the list — there is some room for rewarding a good 
performance in office, the voters’ control over the incumbent remains weaker than in a 
pure majoritarian system, both because electoral districts are larger and because 
candidates may run in more than one district. Unfortunately, the existing empirical 
findings on the effect of different electoral systems on ex-post electoral incentives are 
scant and inconclusive. 
 
A third important element of the fundamental differences in electoral laws is the effect 
that alternative electoral systems may have on the selection of candidates by political 
parties. To this end, we can use the measure of legislators’ quality we derived above 
(namely, their “ability” scores), to analyze the consequences of changes of the electoral 
law on the selection of candidates and hence the quality of elected legislators. We 
document that the change from an open-list proportional system to the mixed-
majoritarian system decreased the ability score of the cohorts of legislators who entered 
Parliament between 1994 and 2001. On the other hand, it appears that the new cohort 
who was elected to Legislature XV (that is, the first cohort elected with the Porcellum) 
was of slightly higher ability than those elected during the Second Republic with the 
mixed-majoritarian system. In fact, with respect to their ability scores, the fractions of 
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“above average” new legislators who were elected to the Parliament under the three 
electoral systems are equal to 62%, 34% and 40%, respectively.58  
 
Large differences emerge in the quality of legislators when we analyze the results at the 
party level (Table 3, Figures 2 and Figure 22, Chapter II). The small, elite parties of the 
First Republic (PLI and PRI) were better equipped to select good politicians in terms of 
their ability score and education level. Furthermore, in the case of the two largest parties 
of the First Republic, DC managed to select better politicians than the PCI in every 
dimension: the median (mean) candidate in the DC had an ability score of 0.64 (0.76) as 
compared to 0.23 (0.17) for the median (mean) candidate in the PCI, and almost 90% of 
the DC legislators had a college degree compared to about 65% in the PCI. Turning the 
attention to the Second Republic, the new recruits of the largest parties, FI and ULIVO, 
are systematically better than those of other parties with respect to their ability score and 
also their level of education. At the opposite end of the spectrum is LN, whose elected 
MPs fare the worst along several dimensions that include their level of education as well 
as their ability scores. However, all parties of the Second Republic are worse than those 
of the First Republic in terms of their proportion of new legislators with above average 
ability scores.  
 
These results portray a completely novel picture of the Italian electoral landscape. A 
better selection of politicians occurred under the open-list proportional system, where the 
recruiting of politicians was essentially done by the parties, with the control of the voters 
being limited to choosing the party and possibly a candidate in the party list. However, 
not all parties, when given this opportunity, were equally successful in recruiting the 
“best” politicians. Moreover, the duration of governments was typically short. Placing the 
selection of the candidates even more under the control of party leaders, as it has recently 
been done with the closed-list proportional system, reduced the overall quality of the 
                                                          
58 It is worth noting that the new cohort elected in 2006 only contains 267 individuals compared to the 
1,065 politicians who were first elected to the House between 1994 and 2001, and the 15th legislature only 
lasted two years. Hence, we have to be very cautious in interpreting the effect of the Porcellum, and we 
need to revisit these findings after more cohorts of legislators are elected with the new law. Also, recall that 
with respect to the open-list proportional electoral system, we could only calculate quality scores for 
Legislatures VIII-XI because of the lack of pre-1981 income data. 
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legislators substantially below that of the legislators elected under the pre-1994 (open-
list) system. Furthermore, the selection of politicians under the mixed-majoritarian law, 
which was strongly advocated during the nineties leading to the abolition of the 
proportional electoral system with the 1996 referendum, proved to be sensibly worse.  
 
These findings have interesting implications for the current debate on the electoral law. In 
fact, although the current electoral system with closed-list proportional representation 
may not be undesirable per se, it is extremely risky, as its implications for the overall 
quality of the Parliament critically hinge on the ability of individual parties to recruit the 
best possible politicians. As suggested by our analysis, this is not always the case.   
 
Should we make a case for less party involvement in the selection of candidates? At least 
to some extent, the answer is yes. The open-list (proportional) system, which gives more 
choice to the voters, performed better than the closed-list (proportional) system. The 
worst selection occurred in a mixed majoritarian system, where recruitment of candidates 
for the different districts was again under strict control of the party. Is an open-list 
proportional system the best possible electoral law for Italy? Should we then go back to 
the First Republic and (continue to) disregard the 1994 referendum? Not necessarily. A 
pure majoritarian system provides better incentives to discipline politicians enhancing 
their electoral accountability, and it contributes to increase government duration. 
Moreover, a majoritarian system coupled with primary elections can also effectively 
reduce the control of party leaders over the selection of candidates. 
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Table 1: Cross-section regressions of log pre-Parliament real annual earnings 
N = 1,910 Robust regression Median regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error 
Intercept 7.2810** 0.4771 7.9123** 0.5453
Age 0.0653** 0.0139 0.0469** 0.0170
Age2 -0.0004** 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002
Female -0.2053** 0.0470 -0.2184** 0.0583
College degree 0.3083** 0.0393 0.3222** 0.0487
AGR -0.6587** 0.1672 -0.7099** 0.1998
EDU -0.2714** 0.0684 -0.3258** 0.0854
HTH -0.3213** 0.0830 -0.3749** 0.1031
INDW -0.3513** 0.0895 -0.3289** 0.1105
INDM 0.0822 0.0721 0.0404 0.0898
LEG -0.0011 0.0714 -0.0258 0.0890
LOB -0.4051** 0.1144 -0.4281 0.1410
MED 0.0498 0.0813 0.0686** 0.1012
MIL -0.0641 0.2349 -0.2213 0.2808
POL -0.4623** 0.0836 -0.4912** 0.1039
SE -0.1507* 0.0796 -0.1780* 0.0989
LexIX 0.8068** 0.3408 0.6733* 0.3701
LexX 0.9515** 0.3415 0.7793** 0.3708
LexXI 1.1746** 0.3431 1.0108** 0.3744
LexXII 1.28158** 0.3474 1.1400** 0.3802
LexXIII 1.2580** 0.3495 1.0598** 0.3831
LexXIV 1.55196** 0.3504 1.4014** 0.3846
LexXV 1.6953** 0.3494 1.5136** 0.3830
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AN -0.0169 0.0718 -0.0858 0.0893
CCD -0.0496 0.0948 -0.1403 0.1178
DC 0.3546** 0.0858 0.3306** 0.1066
FI 0.3029** 0.0630 0.2489** 0.0784
LN -0.2158** 0.0694 -0.2263** 0.0860
MSI -0.0305 0.1484 -0.0735 0.1771
PCI -0.0614 0.0955 -0.1011 0.1185
PDS -0.1353 0.0892 -0.1064 0.1097
PLI 0.4029** 0.2059 0.7278** 0.2378
PRI 0.5082** 0.1336 0.45619** 0.1649
PSDI -0.0212 0.1698 0.0624 0.2048
PSI 0.2307** 0.1025 0.2436** 0.1275
RC -0.3592** 0.0909 -0.3988** 0.1129
ULIVO -0.0245 0.0656 -0.0401 0.0815
Note: A ** denotes significance at the 5% level, a * at the 10% level. 
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Table 2: Panel regression of log real annual extra earnings (N = 13,250) 
Variable Coefficient Std. error 
Intercept 11.1887** 3.6095 
Age 0.0337 0.1002 
Age2 0.0001 0.0002 
Experience 0.0462** 0.0224 
Experience2 -0.0019** 0.0003 
Fraction of the year in Parliament -1.8820** 0.1050 
Note: The estimates of the 2,760 fixed-effect coefficients and the coefficients of the 57 time dummies that 
were included in the regression are not reported here to economize on space. A ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level, a * at the 10% level. 
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Table 3: The “ability scores” of politicians 
Quantiles  
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Interquartile 
Range Mean 
Parties of the First Republic 
DC -0.68 -0.04 0.64 1.60 2.45 1.63 0.76 
MSI -1.28 -0.42 0.44 1.29 1.79 1.70 0.37 
PCI -1.61 -0.63 0.23 1.08 1.79 1.71 0.17 
PLI -0.07 0.59 1.59 2.88 3.30 2.29 1.66 
PRI -0.81 0.10 1.12 2.00 3.01 1.91 1.10 
PSDI -0.60 0.08 0.88 1.99 2.80 1.91 1.07 
PSI -1.20 -0.48 0.34 1.33 2.12 1.82 0.43 
All parties -1.27 -0.47 0.39 1.28 2.17 1.63 0.42 
Parties of the Second Republic 
AN -2.44 -1.34 -0.45 0.33 1.11 1.67 -0.57 
CCD -2.02 -1.27 -0.46 0.37 1.08 1.64 -0.52 
FI -1.61 -0.83 -0.09 1.00 1.75 1.83   0.04 
LN -2.54 -1.47 -0.75 -0.21 0.44 1.27 -0.86 
PDS -1.73 -1.04 -0.33 0.29 1.22 1.32 -0.34 
RC -1.87 -1.31 -0.49 0.30 0.93 1.61 -0.51 
ULIVO -2.35 -1.35 -0.43 0.47 1.12 1.82 -0.51 
All parties -2.21 -1.32 -0.43 0.40 1.29 1.67 -0.47 
Note: The rows that refer to all parties in the First and Second Republic also include minor parties.  
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Table 4: Panel regression of attendance rates (N = 2,775) 
Variable Coefficient Std. error 
Intercept 52.7191** 8.8674 
Age 1.1436** 0.3410 
Age2 -0.0099** 0.0032 
Experience -0.8114** 0.3956 
Experience2 0.0077** 0.0223 
Extra income (in thousands of 2005 Euros) -0.0883** 0.0149 
Note: The estimates of the first stage regression and of the 1,679 fixed-effect coefficients and the 
coefficients of the 7 time dummies that were included in the regression are not reported here to economize 
on space. A ** denotes significance at the 5% level, a * at the 10% level. 
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Figure 1: Annual rate of return of legislative experience
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Figure 2: Percentage of above average politicians: "ability"
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APPENDIX 
 
This study is based on a newly collected longitudinal data set which contains detailed 
information on careers of all the 4,465 individuals who have been elected to the House of 
the Italian Parliament from 1948 (the election of the first Legislature) to 2006 (the 
election of Legislature XV). Our data end in 2008 (the end of Legislature XV), so we 
have complete histories of 4,078 members who left the Italian Parliament on or before 
April 28, 2008 (the date the legislators elected to Legislature XVI were sworn in). But 
histories are right-censored for the remaining 387 MPs who were reelected to serve in 
Legislature XVI. To construct the dataset we used a variety of sources we now describe 
in detail. 
 
For each individual in the sample, the dataset contains:  
1. Biographical data (i.e., date and place of birth, gender, educational background, last 
occupation held prior to entering the Parliament, party affiliation, and region or 
district where elected), and the full record of parliamentary service (with the exact 
dates of entry and, if applicable, exit), of committee and parliamentary group 
membership, of leadership positions within the Parliament, and of all government 
posts held while in Parliament. We obtained this information from Camera dei 
Deputati (2007), the official website of the House, http://www.camera.it., and the 
official website of the government, http://www.governo.it.59 To verify dubious entries 
we also consulted the transcripts of the relevant parliamentary sessions. As an 
additional source of information regarding the professional background of legislators 
we also consulted La Navicella (1949-2001) and Pasquino (1997).  
                                                          
59 At the beginning of our data collection effort we consulted the annals of the Italian Parliament better 
known as La Navicella (1949-2001). These annals have been the primary data source for previous works on 
Italian legislators (see, e.g., Anastasi, 2004). The annals are published once for each Legislature, typically 
during the first half of the term, and contain self-reported biographical information and parliamentary 
activities of all legislators. However, this source proved to be rather imprecise and unsuitable for our needs. 
First and foremost, since La Navicella prints information gathered at one point in time during a Legislature, 
it cannot account for all the changes (such as premature exits, new entries, switches of groups and of 
committee memberships) that occur during the subsequent years. Second, being based entirely on self-
reported information, these annals have a further degree of incompleteness because not all legislators report 
all their activities. 
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2. Annual parliamentary wage since 1948. This information was provided by the Office 
of the Presidency of the House. 
3. Attendance of parliamentary voting sessions for Legislatures VIII-XV. This 
information was provided by the office of the House that records the outcomes of all 
electronic voting sessions, which were introduced in 1979 at the beginning of 
Legislature VIII. 
4. Mode of exit (i.e., voluntary exit, electoral defeat or death). This information was 
obtained from the official electoral lists and the electoral results provided by the 
Ministry of the Interior for each of the 16 general elections held between 1953 and 
2008. 
5. Annual before-tax declared income from 1981 to 2005. This information was 
obtained from the tax returns of each MP starting from their 1982 return (which 
contains information on the income in the previous calendar year), upon visiting the 
archive at the Servizio Prerogative e Immunità of the House, were these returns can 
be consulted in accordance with the Italial Law n.441, 5 July 1982, which established 
the publicity of the tax returns of all elected representatives. 
6. Scandals from 1948 to 1994. To measure the involvement of a legislator in a scandal 
we used the dataset compiled by Golden (2007), which records all the instances 
where a requests was put forward by the Italian judiciary to remove parliamentary 
immunity from a legislator in order to prosecute him or her. The data end in 1994 
because of the constitutional change of November 1993 which eliminated the 
possibility of such requests and fully reinstated the notion of parliamentary immunity. 
7. Post-Parliament employment. For a random sample of 860 MPs we were able to 
identify their main professional activity after exiting the Parliament.  We focused on 
the first two-and-an-half years after the end of their last parliamentary term. The 
procedure we followed to construct a representative sample of former MPs is as 
follows. We first selected all individuals who were born in odd months (January, 
March, May, July, September, and November). For each of them we then gathered 
information from a variety of sources which include books, datasets, the internet, and 
phone interviews. Our starting point were two publications by the Associazione Ex-
Parlamentari della Repubblica (2000, 2002) as well as the books by Martuscelli 
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(1985) and Provantini (1997) which contain some information on the post-Parliament 
occupation of several former MPs. We then searched newspapers archives, the web, 
and the House digital archives. In fact, by reading the transcripts of the House 
sessions, we found all the MPs who resigned from their seat in the Parliament to 
move into offices that, by law, are incompatible with a presence in the Italian 
Parliament (members of the CSM, European Parliaments, Constitutional Court, 
CNEL, and members of regional central administrations). The web was used to match 
the list of legislators with existing datasets on individuals who held the above 
mentioned offices. Last, we used phone interviews, through which we directly 
contacted ex legislators and asked information about their career paths.  
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